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In the constitutional law of the United States there is a natural tendency
to emphasize the judicial enforcibility of constitutional restrictions upon
legislative action. This field of our law tends thus to give primary weight
to a technical analysis of judicial decisions, at the expense of a consideration of the wisdom and expediency of legislative and executive action.
Moreover, it largely overlooks a relatively large field of constitutional regulation not supplemented by judicial enforcibility. We often compare to our
advantage the system of judicially enforcible constitutions with that of
many other countries in which written constitutions are not judicially enforcible but depend for their effectiveness upon the political forces operating
within or upon the government.' Something of more definite value may
perhaps be gained from an examination of the provisions of the federal
and state constitutions that are not judicially enforcible under our system
of constitutional law. To what extent do such provisions exist, and to
what extent do they accomplish their purpose as effectively as judicially
enforcible provisions?
In the answer to the first of these questions attention must be given to
the judicial determinations as to what constitutional provisions are mandatory
and what directory. The term mandatory is used in this article to include
only those provisions of a constitution that are enforcible against a department of government by some means outside of the department itself.
Directory provisions are those not so enforcible.
The political checks of one department upon another suffice to obtain
compliance with some constitutional provisions. If, in addition to this,
there is to be a continuous power to prevent violations of the constitution,
this power must be vested in one of the permanent departments of govern*This article is a revision of a chapter prepared some years ago for inclusion in a proposed volume on Constitutional Construction. In the checking of authorities down to date aid
has been received from Mr. Victor E. Ferrall, now a Sterling Fellow in the Yale Law School.

There is no intention, to discuss here instances of constitutional provisions capable of
judicial enforcement, but frequently violated without contest. With respect to appropriations,
discussions of this subject will be found in the following articles: Warren, Massachusetts as
a PhilanthropicRobber (1898) 12 HARV. L. REv. 316; Fleisher, Pennsylvani's Appropriarions to Privately-managedCharitableInstitutions (915) 30 PoL. Scl. Q. 15. Many statutes
escape judicial contest although violative of constitutional provisions.
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ment. The experience of Pennsylvania and Vermont with councils of
censors demonstrates the futility of attempting to prevent violations of a
written constitution through the election of a body to sit occasionally without power to enforce its recommendations.
If a function is committed exclusively and without external control to
one department of government, constitutional provisions regarding that
matter are directory to that department. This statement applies to the
judicial department no less than to the executive and legislative departments.
A constitutional command to the judicial department may be enforcible by
the highest state court with respect to the lower courts, but a constitutional
command to the highest state court is, of necessity, merely directory. For
example, a constitutional requirement that the state supreme court report
defects in the constitution and laws to the legislature at regular intervals
is mandatory in form but directory in fact, and the courts pay little or no
2
attention to the requirement.
The essential difference in the three departments of government with
respect to this matter is that few constitutional commands and restrictions
are directed to the courts, and not many more to the executive department.
The state constitutions are primarily restrictions, upon the legislative department. The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is therefore more important as to the legislative and executive departments, for in
these departments there is a possibility of enforcement through judicial
action, and it is most important with respect to the legislature, because that
department has the broadest power of affirmative action in determining
governmental policy. The court as a body to enforce constitutional restrictions upon itself would almost certainly be ineffective, but if there is to be
a continuous enforcibility of constitutional restrictions upon the legislature
and the executive, the court is the logical body to exercise such power, not
so much because its function is that of construing the law but because of
the fact that if there is to be continuous external control, such control can
best be vested in the department whose functions least require such external
control. The fact that there are few constitutional restrictions upon judicial
power is not due to general satisfaction with the judicial department, but
rather to the fact that constitutional restrictions and commands are necessarily directed to the legislature as the department of government having
power to determine matters of governmental policy.
Under our system of judicial control, the courts not only determine the
constitutional issues that are properly before them, but also determine the
extent to which the final decision rests in other departments of government
as to issues committed in the first instance to such other departments. A
2
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska, Texas, Utah, Washington.
spondence between Governor and Judges, 243 Ill. 9 (i9o9).

See Corre-
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study of the judicial non-enforcibility of constitutional provisions thus
becomes (as elsewhere in our constitutional law) a study of judicial decisions, though in some cases the constitutional provision commits a function
so clearly to another department as to make the judicial result a certain
one. Yet all courts do not by any means determine the issues in the same
manner, nor does the same court adhere to any well-defined principles.
FUNCTIONS COMMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO ONE DEPARTMENT

Constitutions in some cases clearly commit a function to the uncontrolled discretion of a single department. 3 For example, the Constitution
of the United States and the state constitutions provide that each house of
the legislature shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications
of its own members. 4 The same statement holds true where the constitution commits to the legislature for final determination contests as to the
governorship or other offices,5 or the issue as to whether a constitutional
amendment has been adopted." The refusal of the court to decide such
cases is not based on a view that the questions are of a type improper for
judicial consideration, but on the ground that the matters are exclusively
committed to another department. Where power is not constitutionally
7
denied to them, courts will exercise jurisdiction in such matters.
When the governor or president is authorized to call extra sessions of
the legislative bodies "on extraordinary occasions," discretion is clearly
committed to the executive as to what constitutes an extraordinary occasion,
although the Kansas court suggests that complete discretion here may not
be uncontrolled. 8 Constitutional provisions authorizing the governor to
'On this matter, see COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) IoI-IO3.

'State ex rel. Attorney General v. Tomlinson, 20 Kan. 692 (1878); Opinion of the
Justices, 56 N. H. 570 (1875) ; Naumann v. Board of City Canvassers, 73 Mich. 252, 41 N.
W. 267 (1889) ; People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunne, 258 Ill. 441, 456-466, IOI N. E. 560, 566-569
(1913) ; Opinion of Justices, 7 Me. 483 (1830) ; Attorney General ex rel. Beers v. Board of
Canvassers, 1.55 Mich. 44, i18 N. W. 584 (19o8) ; State ex rel. Boulware v. Porter, 55 Mont.
471, 178 Pac. 832 (1919) ; State ex rel. Alexander v. Pharr, 179 N. C. 699, 1O3 S. E. 8
(192o) ; State ex rtel. Barbes v. Circuit Court, 178 Wis. 468, 19o N. W. 563 (1922) ; Dingerman v. Board of Canvassers, 198 Mich. 135, 164 N. W. 492 (1917) ; Davis v. Wilson et aL.,
35 S. W. (2d) 1O2O (Ark. 1931). Other cases are collected in COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 270, n. 3. A similar rule seems properly applicable to members of constitutional conventions, whether the constitution expressly so provides or not. DODD, REVISION AND AMENDME.NT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) 88, n. 28. Local legislative bodies are frequently
given power to pass finally on the election and qualification of their members. Sinclair v.
Common Council, 181 Mich. 186, 147 N. W. 942 (1914).
'Taylor v. Beckham, io8 Ky. 278, 56 S. W. 177 (I9OO), reviewed in 178 U. S. 548, 2o
Sup. Ct. 8go (I900).

'Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 27 AtI. 616 (1893).
' For authorities regarding election contests see infra notes 159-166. For cases regarding judicial power with respect to constitutional amendments see infra note 172.
"Whiteman v. Railroad Co., 2 Harr. 514, 524 (Del. 1839); Opinion, 9 Colo. 642, 21
Pac. 477 (1886) ; Farrelly v. Cole, 6o Kan. 356, 374, 56 Pac. 492, 498 (899).
But see State
v. Howat, lO7 Kan. 423, 430, 191 Pac. 585, 589 (1920). For general statements regarding
the governor's power to call special sessions, see Simpson v. Hill, 128 Okla. 269, 263 Pac. 635
(1927) and Dyer v. Shaw et aL., 139 Okla. I65, 281 Pac. 776 (1929). Where the constitution limits the special session to matters specified by- the governor, such a limitation is judicially enforcible.
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adjourn the legislature, upon disagreement of the two houses with respect
to the time of adjournment, appear to commit to the governor's uncontrolled
determination the issue as to whether there is a sufficient disagreement
between the two houses, but this is perhaps not quite so clear as in the case
of calling extraordinary sessions. 9
So, also, where a constitution vests in a governor power to remove
certain officers for a specified cause, the governor's determination that such
cause exists is not subject to judicial inquiry, although the courts disagree
as to whether the officer is entitled to notice and hearing. 10 Where notice
and hearing are said to be necessary, the power is regarded as a quasijudicial power vested exclusively in the governor. Similarly the power of
impeachment, while judicial in its nature, is vested exclusively in the legis"If a court is required to give an accused person a trial at
lative bodies."
the first term after indictment, unless good cause be shown for continuance,
it is obvious that the question of good cause is one for the court alone to
pass upon, and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the
nature of the case, final." 12
When a constitution provides that laws shall not take effect until a
future date unless in case of emergency declared in a certain manner by
the legislature, it would appear that the legislature has an uncontrolled discretion to determine whether an emergency exists. 1 3 To comply with the
constitution there must be a declaration of an emergency,' 4 but under similar
constitutional language the courts are in disagreement as to whether the
grounds of the emergency must be specified. The Illinois constitution requires that the "emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of
the act", and the Illinois court requires that the grounds of the emergency
be set out, although apparently it will not inquire into the sufficiency of the
facts alleged to constitute the emergency. 15 Under almost identical consti' People ex reL. Harless v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 (1863) ; In re Legislative Adjournment, I8
R. I. 824, 27 Atl. 324 (1894) ; REPORT OF ATTomEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS (I912) 73; Note
(1894) 22 L. R. A. 716.
See Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okla. 121, 113 Pac. 944" (1911) for a discussion of the power of
the governor to convene the legislature at another place than the seat of government "when
in his opinion the public safety or welfare, or the safety or health of the members, require it."
" Wilcox v. People, 9o Ill. 186 (1878) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Coffey, 237 Mich. 591,
213 N. W. 46o (1927) ; State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, 32 N. M. 265, 255 Pac. 1077 (1927).
Tuttle, Removal of Public 01cers From Offlce for Cause (9o5) 3 MicH. L. REv. 290, 341.
See also Note (1912) 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 788.
" State v. Chambers, 96 Okla. 78, 220 Pac. 89o (1923).
'COOLEY,

oP. cit. supra note 3, at 1o3.

ICarpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415 (Ind. 1845) ; Note (192o) 7 A. L. R. 519. In
Martin v. Hidalgo County, 271 S.W. 436 (Tex. 1925) the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
said at 438: "The Constitution permits the Legislature to release counties, cities, or towns

from payment of taxes levied for state or county purposes in case of great public calamity,
and to the Legislature alone is confided the power of deciding if such public calamity exists."
"State v. Pacific Express Co., 8o Neb. 823, 115 N. W. 619 (19o8).
See also Biggs v. McBride, 17
283, 139 N. E. 39o (1923).
Graham v. Dye, 3o8 Ill.
Ore. 640, 21 Pac. 878 (1889). Under the referendum in Maine the emergency must be ex-
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tutional language the Virginia. court reaches a result directly opposed to
that of Illinois. 16 The Kentucky constitution requires that the reasons for
the emergency "be set out at length in the journal of each house", and the
17
Kentucky court will apparently consider the sufficiency of the reasons,
though this runs counter to the general view.
Since the introduction of the referendum in a number of states,
emergency declarations have presented a new problem. In these states it
is common for constitutions to provide that the referendum shall not apply
to laws that are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety.'s The purpose of the referendum is to permit a
popular vote upon legislative enactments. An unrestrained declaration of
emergencies by the legislature would defeat this purpose. In six sessions
of the South Dakota legislature, running from 1899 to i909, emergency
clauses were inserted into 537 acts of the 1251 that were passed.' 9 The
constitution of Maryland postpones the operation of a law "unless it contain a section declaring such law an emergency law", and thus makes it certain that the legislative judgment is final as to the existence of an
emergency. 2 0 Other constitutions do not determine the issue, and the courts
25
24
22
Arkansas,
Michigan, 23 South Dakota,
of Washington, 21 California,

Montana 20 and Missouri 27 take the view that legislative declarations of
emergency are subject to judicial review; the view of the Ohio court upon
30
29
this matter is uncertain ; 28 the courts of Oregon, Oklahoma, Colorado 31
pressed in the preamble and approved by a two-thirds vote. These requirements are judicially
enforcible, though the grounds of emergency appear not to be open to judicial question.
Payne v. Graham, II8 Me. 251, 107 Ati. 7o9 (igig).
' City of Roanoke v. Elliott, 123 Va. 393, 96 S. E. 819 (1918) ; Breckenridge v. County
School Board, 146 Va. 1, 135 S. E. 693 (1926).
' McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 221Ky. i6, 297 S. W. 931 (927).
"DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 535-537.
AND POPULAR GOVENMENT (1921) 175.
"LoWELL, PUBLIC OPIXNIO
"Culp v. Commissioners of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 141 Atl. 410 (1928).
'State v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 Pac. Ir (1915);State v. Hinkle, I52 Wash. 22r,
277 Pac. 837 (929).
'it re McDermott, r8o Cal. 783, 183 Pac. 437 (919).
'Attorney General v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524, 145 N. W. 98 (1914); Naudzius v. Lahr,
253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581 (1931).
"Johnson v. Jones, 48 S. D. 260, 204 N. W. 15 (i925); State v. Smith, 49 S. D. io6,
2o6 N. W. 233 (1925) ; li re Opinion of Judges, 234 N. W. 671 (S. D. 1931).
"Jumper v. McCollum, 179 Ark. 837, I8 S. W. (2d) 359 (1929).
322

State v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, I87 Pac. 641 (1920).
State v. Sullivan, 283 Mo. 546, 224 S. W. 327 (I92O) ; Hollowell v. Schuyler County,
Mo. 1230, 18 S. W. (2d) 498 (I929).
IState

v. Smith,

1o2

Ohio St. 591, 133 N. E. 457 (1g2I).

But see statement in dissent-

ing opinion in State v. Fremont, 116 Ohio St. 469, 479, 157 N. E. 318, 320 (027). The
issue also appears to be unsettled in North Dakota. State v. Crawford, 36 N. D. 385, 162
N. W. 710 (917).

."Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. i18, 74 Pac. 7IO (I9O3) ; Cameron v. Stevens, 121 Ore.
538, 256 Pac. 395 (1927). But the court will inquire into the facts as to a declaration of
emergency in an ordinance. Joplin v. Ten Brook, 124 Ore. 36, 263 Pac. 893 (928).
' Oklahoma City v. Shields, 22 Okla. 265, IOO Pac. 559 (1908).
'Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 Pac. iio8 (I916) ; Shields v. City of Loveland,
74 Colo. 27, 2x8 Pac. 9r3 (1923).
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and Arizona 32 adhere to the view of uncontrolled legislative discretion.
To some extent, this conflict of opinion is based upon differences of constitutional language, but in the main it is a difference of judicial opinion.
The Montana court distinguishes its view from that of Oregon on the basis
of a difference in constitutional language, but the distinction seems untenable. The Oregon referendum provision was largely copied by Colorado,
Missouri and Washington. The Colorado court regards the Oregon decisions as to legislative discretion as controlling; the Missouri and Washington courts reject this view and regard the question of emergency as open
to judicial review. The Arkansas court originally held the legislative determination conclusive, but changed its view upon the adoption of a state
constitutional amendment in 1918 specifically requiring a legislative statement of the facts constituting the emergency and a separate vote thereon.
In a number of states the courts have thus brought under judicial control
a power theretofore regarded as within the unrestricted control of legislative bodies.
In some cases constitutional language is so clear that the courts can
give nothing of mandatory force to a provision; of this character is the
provision in the constitution of New Jersey that:
"The legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases
enumerated in this paragraph, and for all other cases which, in its
judgment, may be provided for by general laws." 3
But where the language is not so dear, one must discover what the court
of the particular state says as to the provision involved. The Wisconsin
constitution provides that "the legislature shall establish but one system of
town and county government, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable." The degree of practicable uniformity would seem to be committed
to the legislature, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says this is hot so,
34
although it concedes a broad discretion to the legislature.
The constitution of Mississippi says that "every bill introduced in the
legislature shall have a title and the title ought to indicate clearly the subjectmatter or matters of the proposed legislation"; the Mississippi court holds,
with much show of reason, that "ought" in this connection made the provision as to nature of title directory, although the requirement of title is
mandatory.3 5 Somewhat similar was the Missouri constitutional provision
' Orme v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 25 Ariz. 324, 217 Pac. 935 (1923).
' N. J. Const. of 1844, art. 4, § 7, cl. ii. The Mississippi constitution is even more explicit in this matter, Miss. Const. of 18go, art. 4, § go.
" State ex reL. Peck v. Riordan, 24 Wis. 484 (I869); State ex rel. Scanlan v. Archibold,
r46 Wis. 363, 131 N. W. 895 (I9II).
'Mayor v. State, iO2 Miss. 663. 59 So. 873 (1912); Lang v. Board of Supervisors, 114
Miss. 34r, 75 So. I26 (1917).
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declaring that "all property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to its value"; the provision here was held to forbid taxation in any
other manner than in proportion to value, the court taking occasion to say
that the word ought as used in a number of constitutional provisions was
clearly mandatory.88
A number of state constitutions, after enumerating subjects in detail
in which local or special legislation is forbidden, declare that: "In all other
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted." The language of this provision is more mandatory than that of
the Wisconsin clause referred to above, but the view of state courts in general is that the provision has no judicial enforcibility against the legislature,3 7 and this view is justified by the fact that the constitutional language
specifically enumerates the things expressly forbidden and implies that the
legislature is to determine "where a general law can be made applicable" in
other cases. Yet the courts of California, Oklahoma and Montana have
taken the view that no legislative discretion exists to pass a special law in
a case where, in the judicial opinion, a general law has already been made
applicable."
This makes the clause accomplish the same purpose as the
more specific one in Georgia and Maryland that no special law shall be
enacted "in any case for which provision has been made by an existing
general law." The latter type of provision appears clearly subject to judicial
enforcement. 30
In addition there seems now a tendency toward the view that the question as to "where a general law can be made applicable" is fully open to
judicial inquiry. The Indiana court for a while took this position.4 0 The
South Carolina Supreme Court, after much vacillation, appears to have
decided that it is for the court to determine in last resort whether a general
law could have been made applicable, 4 1 and a similar point of view has
'Life Association of America v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512 (1872).
" Merrills, Some Aspects of Judicial Control over Special and Local Legislation (1913)

47 Ams. L. REv. 351. People v. Borgeson, 335 Il1. 136, 146, 166 N. E. 451, 4.55 (1929).
' Ventura County Harbor Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 295 Pac. 6 (Cal. 193o) ; White
v. Infield, 122 Okla. 4, 250 Pac. 81 (1926) ; State v. Meyers, 6.5 Mont. 124, 21o Pac. iO64
(1922).

" State v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 113 Md. 179, 77 AtI. 433 (igo) ; O'Dowd's Sons v.
City of Augusta, 141 Ga. 748, 82 S. E. 148 (1914).
Section io5 of the Alabama constitution forbids a special, private or local law "in any
case which is provided for by a general law, or when the relief sought can be given by any
court of this state; and the courts, and not the legislature, shall judge as to whether the
matter of said law is provided for by a general law, and as to whether the relief sought can
be given by any court".
I Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4 (1854); Board of Commissioners v.
Fetter, 193 Ind. 288, 296, 139 N. E. 451, 454 (1923).
'1 Barfield v. Stevens Mercantile Co., 85 S. C. 186, 67 S. E. 1.8 (igog). Later South
Carolina cases attribute great weight to the legislative determination, and appear to seek an
"equal protection of the laws" basis for their decision. Thomas v. Spartanburg Ry. Gas &
Electric Co., IOO S. C. 478, 85 S. E. 50 (1914) ; City of Columbia v. Smith, 1O5 S. C. 348, 89
S. E. lo28 (1916) ; Sirrine v. State, 132 S. C. 241, 128 S. E. 172 (1925).
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recently been expressed by the courts of Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma and Vyoming. 42 The Missouri constitution of
1875 expressly provided that whether a general law could have been made
applicable shall be a judicial question, and several states have followed
Missouri's example; 43 but it is obvious that the courts can accomplish the
same result without change in the constitutional text. The judicial decisions as to declarations of emergency and as to special legislation make it
sufficiently clear that constitutional texts alone cannot be relied upon to determine what matters are committed exclusively to legislative and executive
determination.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS

American courts have, however, differed most as to the mandatory or
directory character of certain constitutional limitations within the field of
legislative procedure. Constitutional limitations within this field fall into
two classes:
(I) Provisions whose observance or violation must be discovered by
evidence external to the enactment of the legislature itself; e. g., requirements as to three readings of the measure in each house, as to recording of
ayes and nays upon the passage, as to the requisite majority of members
for passage, as to printing of bills before final passage, as to committee
reports required in the consideration of bills, and public notice required by
some constitutions of application for local and special legislation.
(2) Those the observance or violation of which may be discovered
by examining the text of the statute enacted by the legislature; e. g., requirements as to titles of bills, amendment by reference, form of enacting clause,
separation of appropriations from substantive legislation. Provisions of
this character, when couched in obligatory language, are in most cases held
to be mandatory and judicially enforcible; although to this statement at
least one exception must be made, for in Ohio a constitutional provision
that "no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly
44
expressed in its title", is held to be merely of a directory character.
These two classes of limitations are found in close relation to each
other in constitutional texts, particularly with reference to the enactment
' State v. Schofield, 53 Mont. .502, 16.5 Pac. .594 (1917) ; Cunningham v. Douglas County,
lO4 Neb. 40.5, 177 N. W. 742 (192o); Scarbrough v. Wooten, 23 N. M. 616, 170 Pac. 743
(1918) ; Baird v. Rask, 234 N. W. 651 (N. D. 1931) ; School District No. 85 v. School District No. 71, 135 Okla. 270, 276 Pac. 186 (1928) ; State v. Snyder, 3o Wyo. 287, 219 Pac. 735
(1923). See also Stratman v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 500, 125 S. W. 1094 (910).
Minnesota (1892), Kansas (19o6), Michigan (I908). For a similar provision in AlaM1
bama, see supra note 39. See Merrills, op. cit. supra note 37.
" Oshe v. State, 37 Ohio St. 494 (1882), and cases there cited. A similar statutory provision with respect to ordinances is held to be mandatory. Hefner v. City, 75 Ohio St. 413,
8o N. E. 8 (907).
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of legislation and the proposal of constitutional amendments. For example,
the constitution of Maine provides that in case of declarations of emergency
to withdraw an act from the referendum, legislative action shall be by a
two-thirds vote of all the members, "with the facts constituting the
emergency . . expressed in the preamble of the act". Formal compliance with the one requirement can be discovered from the face of the
act; with respect to the other, resort must be had to the legislative journals.
In at least one case a constitution makes it clear that the two types of provisions are judicially enforcible. The Alabama constitution requires that
certain things be done in the enactment of local and special legislation and
that journal entry be made thereof, and then adds:
"The courts shall pronounce void every special, private or local
law which the journals do not affirmatively show was passed in accordance with the provisions of this section." 45
But there are few provisions of this character.
If the enactment of a measure by the legislature is itself regarded as
conclusive that all steps in its passage have been properly taken, clearly the
provisions in the first class just referred to are directory, for nothing upon
the face of the measure indicates compliance or non-compliance with them.
The question becomes therefore one of proof. If the enrolled bill (i. e., the
enactment as it comes from the legislature) is conclusive, these provisions
rest for their enforcement upon the legislative bodies alone. If proof may
be sought for in the records of legislative proceedings, the court may then
enforce legislative compliance with the requirements, or at least, enforce
the entry of a record upon legislative journals that such compliance has
been had. In some cases it would be substantially impossible to enforce
compliance even to the extent of requiring a journal entry. Where a constitution requires that a bill be distinctly read, no journal entry of the legislative body could indicate the distinctness of the reading, and no court
would seek to inquire into the compliance with such a requirement; it would
be regarded as within the judgment of the legislative body.
All of the state constitutions either directly or indirectly require the
legislative bodies to keep journals. As to use of these journals to test
compliance with constitutional forms, two situations present themselves:
( i ) The constitution requires certain procedural steps but does not expressly
require journal entry to the effect that these steps were taken; (2) The
constitution requires certain steps and also expressly requires journal entry
to the effect that the steps have been taken. Although a more clearly
mandatory character would appear to attach to provisions reinforced by
' Alabama constitution of igoi, art. 4, § io6.
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an express requirement of journal entry, the courts have not always distinguished between the two types of provisions just referred to.
The tendency of the courts has been to regard the enrolled bill as conclusive when the constitution itself requires no record of compliance with
prescribed forms of legislative procedure; this accords with the presumption
that in absence of proof to the contrary public officers have done their duty.
Absence of record should raise no presumption of non-compliance. 46 The
most important recent exception to the statement just made is the Illinois
case of Neiberger v. McCullough.47 The Illinois constitution of I87O requires that a "bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the
vote is taken on its final passage". The constitution does not expressly
require that a journal entry indicate that such printing actually took place,
though journal entries are expressly required with respect to some of the
other constitutionally prescribed steps in legislative procedure. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a law would be unconstitutional unless
it appeared from the journals that printing was had in compliance with
constitutional requirements, but later decisions have substantially abandoned
this position.

48

Where the journals themselves affirmatively show non-compliance
(although required to show nothing) a presumption that there has been
compliance would naturally be weakened. Some constitutions require public
notice, in the locality affected, of intention to apply for the passage of a
local or special law, but do not require a record of such notice in the
journals; under such provisions the practice of courts in general is to
assume that the passage of a local or special law carries with it conclusive
proof that notice was given in the manner required; the Pennsylvania court,
however, held that a local act was unconstitutional where it was clear that
no notice had been given. 49 And the courts of Arkansas and Florida have
taken the view that they would not conclusively presume the notice to have
been given when the period required for such notice was longer than the
interval intervening between the calling of a special session and the enact(Lewis' ed. I9O4)
earlier cases will
be found in (894) 23 L. R. A. 340. With respect to absence of journal entries when none
are constitutionally required, see State v. Joseph, 139 La. 734, 72 So. i88 (1916) ; State v.
City of Palmetto, 99 Fla. 401, 4o6, 126 So. 781, 783 (i93o) ; Er parte Seward, 29 Mo. 385,
397-8, 253 S.W. 356, 358 (1923).
47253 Ill. 312, 97 N. E. 66o (I912).
"See Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 Ill. 478, iog N. E. 999 (915) ; People ex rel.
Zeno v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 278 Ill. 144, 115 N. E. 852 (917).
The Illinois
court sought ingeniously in several cases to prevent contest of earlier and well-established
laws on the ground asserted in the Neiberger case. Greenberg et al. v. City of Chicago et aL.,
256 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. IO39 (1912) ; Richter v. Burdock, 257 Ill. 41o, 100 N. E. i63 (913).
'Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246, 33 Atl. io48 (1896) ; see also Brodnax v. Groom,
"Upon this whole matter,

see SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTioN
(911)
4o L. R. A. (N. s.) i. A note of

§§ 32-59; and an excellent note,

64 N. C. 244 (i87o).
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ment of the law.50 In New Jersey the courts decline to follow the rule of
presuming notice to have been given, because of the enactment of the special
law, but the New Jersey constitutional provision requiring such notice is
aided by a requirement that the legislature "shall prescribe the time and
mode of giving such notice, the evidence thereof and how such evidence
shall be preserved." The legislature had prescribed the manner of giving
notice and preserving evidence thereof. The requirement with respect to
preservation of notice was treated as equivalent to a requirement of record
of such notice, to which the courts might resort to impeach the enactment. 51
The New Jersey cases are based, therefore, primarily upon the ground that
there is a constitutional requirement, supported by necessity of record as
to compliance therewith.
Where it is permitted, local and special legislation is peculiarly subject
to abuse, and a requirement of notice before introducing such legislation
is of no value if the passage of the measure raises a conclusive presumption
that notice was given. For this reason the Missouri constitution requires
that "the notice shall be recited in the act". The court can thus determine
from the face of the act, without examining the journals, that the legislature
declares notice to have been given. The constitution of Florida was amended
in 1928 to require that "affidavit constituting proof of publication be
attached to the bill when introduced and be entered in full upon the journals". This creates a mandatory duty, for the Florida courts examine the
2
legislative journals, where the constitution requires journal entry.
Where a constitution requires a certain procedure (as that the vote
shall be by ayes and nays on the final passage of all bills), and also expressly
requires journal entry of compliance with such requirement, the view naturally suggests itself that the added requirement of journal entry directs
the court to the journal as the standard by which to test compliance with
the requirement. This view would appear to be the more natural one. The
South Carolina court has stated that it is within the power of the court "to
inquire into those prerequisites fixed by the constitution, and of which prerequisites the journals of the two houses are required to furnish evidence";
and the courts of North Carolina and Montana feel that they are required
' Booe v. Road Improvement District, 141 Ark. 14o, 151, 216 S. W. 500, 504 (1919) ;
Ark-Ash Lumber Co. v. Pride & Fairley, 162 Ark. 235, 258 S. W. 335 (19z4); Horton v.
Kyle, 81 Fla. 274, 88 So. 757 (I921). But the insufficiency of time was required to be shown
to a certainty. Conlee v. Miller, 144 Ark. 56, 221 S. W. 465 (ig2o) ; State ex. reL. Buford v.
Fearnside, 87 Fla. 349, 36o, IOO So. 256, 259 (1924).
" Freeholders of Passaic County v. Stevenson, 46 N. J. L. 173 (1884); Township of
Ewing v. City of Trenton, 57 N. J. L. 318, 31 AtI. 223 (1894) ; Attorney General v. Borough of Tuckerton, 67 N. J. L. 120, so Atl. 6o2 (igoi).
'Whitney v. Hillsborough County, 99 Fla. 628, 127 So. 486 (193o) ; Douglas v. Webber,
99 la. 755, 128 So. 613 (1930).
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by the constitution to examine the legislative journals under certain con53
ditions.
In Missouri requirements of certain action and of journal entry thereof
are supplemented by a provision that:
"No bill shall become a law until the same shall have been signed
by the presiding officer of each of the two houses in open session; and
before such officer shall affix his signature to any bill, he shall suspend
all other business, declare that such bill now be read, and that, if no
objections be made, he will sign the same to the end that it may become
a law. The bill shall then be read at length, and if no objection be
made he shall, in the presence of the house, in open session, and before
any other business is entertained, affix his signature, which fact shall
be noted on the journal. .

.

. If in either house any member shall

object that any substitution, omission or insertion has occurred, so
that the bill proposed to be signed is not the same in substance and
form as when considered and passed by the house, or that any particular clause of this article of the constitution has been violated in its
passage, such objection shall be passed upon by the house, and if sustained, the presiding officer shall withhold his signature; but if such
objection shall not be sustained, then any five members may embody
the same, over their signatures, in a written protest, under oath, against
the signing of the bill. Said protest, when offered in the house, shall
be noted upon the journal, and the original shall be annexed to the bill
to be considered by the governor in connection therewith."
It was urged with some plausibility that this provision committed to
the legislative bodies finally the determination as to procedural requisites
of legislation, but a majority of the Missouri court took the view that the
enacted measure might be impeached by an examination of the legislative
journals,"4 and a statute was held invalid because the journals showed
passage by less than the requisite constitutional majority.
Unaided by such a provision as that in Missouri," the courts of some
states have, however, taken the view that legislative journals may not be
examined to impeach an enrolled bill, even when a constitution expressly
requires compliance with a procedural form to be noted on the journals.
t' State ex rel. Hoover v. Town Council of Chester, 39 S. C. 307, 317, 17 S. E. 752, 755
; Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C. 223, 22 S. E. 16 (1895) ; State ex rel. Woodward v. Moul-

(893)

ton el aL, 57 Mont. 414, 426, 189 Pac. 59, 64 (i92o). But the courts of Montana and North
Carolina base their decisions on obligatory language in the constitutions, which they regard
as forcing them to examine the journals in a single instance only.
See the
c4State ex rel. Schmoll v. Drabelle et al., 261 Mo. 5,5, 170 S. W. 465 (914).
interesting dissent by Judge Graves. It may be that the judges are influenced by their knowledge that the bills are not read at length, and that the Missouri provision (constitution of
1875, art. 4, § 37) and a similar one in New Mexico (constitution of 1912, art. 4, § 20) are
in certain respects complied with only to the extent of proper journal entries.
I But a member of states require signature by presiding officers, either in the presence of
the house or otherwise, and this is given weight in the decisions holding that the bill so
signed may not be impeached by the examination of journals.
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The courts of California,56 Georgia, 57 Kentucky, 58 Nevada" 9 and New
Mexico 60 have taken this view in cases necessarily involving the decision
of the issue; but the Kentucky court now recognizes at least one exception
to this rule. The courts of Indiana, 6 Iowa,6 2 Mississippi, 63 Pennsylvania,6"
South Dakota 65 and Washington 66 have made positive statements in support of the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill, but the cases in which these
statements were made do not appear necessarily to have involved journal
entries expressly required by the constitutions of those states. Montana
and North Carolina 67 adopt the same view, with a single exception in each
state. The South Carolina court makes broad statements to the same effect,
but apparently does not intend to foreclose its power to examine journal
entries required by the constitution. 68 The New Jersey case of State v.
Youing, 69 is frequently quoted in support of the finality of the enrolled bill,
and this view has the support of later New Jersey cases; '0 but since 1873
the statutes have authorized a proceeding, to be brought within one year,
to determine whether a statute has been duly passed or duly approved "as
required by the constitution", and in this type of proceeding the courts will
'County of Yolo v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 26.5, 64 Pac. 403 (19O1).
In California the doctrine of finality is carried a step farther. The California constitution provides that after a
municipal charter amendment has been ratified by a vote of the people the legislature may approve or reject it as a whole. The court held that this provision clearly placed the duty upon
the legislature to see ti-at the proceedings by wh;ch the charter amendments were proposed
to the people were regular in all respects; and that since the amendment in question had been
approved by the legislature and duly enrolled and filed as a law its validity (as to the manner
of its proposal to the people) could not be questioned. Taylor v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327, 257 Pac.
40 (1927).
" eLoach v. Newton, 134 Ga. 739, 68 S. E. 7o8 (igio) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.
v. The State, 135 Ga. 545, 69 S. E. 725 (19io) ; Dorsey v. Wright, 15o Ga. 321, 103 S. E. 591

(192o).
'Lafferty v. Huffman, 99 Ky. 8o, 35 S. W. 123 (1896)
V. 222 (I9go).
But the Kentucky court goes back

; Duncan v. Combs, 131 Ky. 330,
of the enrolled bill with respect
to declarations of emergency, the constitution requiring the reasons to be set out in the journals. See supra note 17.
' State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. ioo8 (1899).
'Kelley v. Marron, 21 N. M. 239, 153 Pac. 262 (1915) ; Smith v. Lucero, 23 N. M. 411,
168 Pac. 709 (i9i8).
"Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514 (1869).
'State ex rel. Hammond v. Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 151 N. W. 8I (915); Davidson
Building Co. v. Mulock, 235 N. W. 45 (Iowa 193).
'Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512 (1886) ; State ex rel. Collins v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727,
81 So. I (1919).
Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877).
' Narregong v. Brown County, 14 S. D. 357, 85 N. W. 6o2 (19oi) ; Kiakowski v. Wasker, 33 S. D. 335, 145 N. W. 566 (914).
"State v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201 (1893) ; State v. State Board, 140 Wash. 433,
249 Pac. 996 (1926). There is a strong dictum to the same effect in Arizona. See Allen v.
State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 Pac. 1114 (913).
See also cases cited in King v. Terrall, 218 S. W.
42 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o).
' See supra note 53.
'Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission, I47 S. C. 116, 128, 144 S. E. 846, 850
(1928) ; Williamson v. Richards, i58 S. C. 534, 155 S. E. 890 (1930).
"32 N. J. L. 29 (1866).
Passaic v. Stevenson, 46 N. J. L. 173 (1884) ; Bloomfield v. Freeholders of Middlesex, 74 N. J. L. 261, 6.5 Atl. 89o (19o7). But see In re Hague, IO4 N. J. Eq. 31, 51, r45 Atl.
618 (1929).
115 S.
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admit evidence as to the legislative proceedings. 7 ' Moreover, New Jersey
72
makes an exception with respect to notice of local and special legislation.
Field v. Clark 73 appears to commit the United States Supreme Court
squarely to the doctrine of the finality of the enrolled bill, and has the support of recent approval in Leser v. Garnett;7- but Mr. Justice Harlan's
language in Field v. Clark and Harwood z,. Wentworth 7- implies an exception of expressly required journal entries, and there is some doubt as to
what the court may decide should the journals not show "the names of the
persons voting for and against the bill", as required by Article I, Section 7,
of the Constitution, when bills are passed over the president's veto.
The Georgia court has well expressed the rule as to the finality of the
enrolled bill:
"When an enrolled act is signed by the presiding officers of both
houses, approved by the governor, ana deposited in the office of the
secretary of state, it will be conclusively presumed that the measure
was properly put to a vote in both houses, and that it received a constitutional majority; and the court will not upset the act because the
journals of the houses happened to show that it did not receive a majority of the votes of either or both branches of the legislature." 76
This view was somewhat more broadly expressed by the Supreme Court
of Washington:
"Finding an enrolled bill in the office of the secretary of state,
unless that bill carries its death warrant in its hand, the courts will
make no investigation of the antecedent history connected with its
passage, except as such an investigation may be necessary in case of
ambiguity in the bill for the purpose of determining the legislative
intent."
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There is much basis in fact for the view that as to procedural matters
an enrolled bill may not be impeached by reference to legislative journals,
even though journal entries as to such procedural steps are expressly required by the constitutional text. The refusal to go to the journals results,
of course, in making these provisions directory-commits the observance
of such requirements to uncontrolled legislative discretion. Several reasons
unite to cause courts to reach this result:
The court can inquire only as to whether there is journal entry
of compliance with constitutional forms, not whether there is actual com(i)

'In re Petition of Attorney General, 98 N. J. L. 586,

121

Atl. 736

(1923).

Passaic v. Stevenson, 46 N. J. L. 173 (1884).
143 U. S. 649, i2 Sup. Ct. 495 (1892).
7'258 U. S. 130, 42 Sup. Ct. 217 (1922).
X162 U. S. 547, 562, i6 Sup. Ct. 89o, 894 (I895).
"'Atlantic Coast Line v. State, 135 Ga. 545, 551, 69 S. E. 725, 728 (1910).
' State v. State Board, 140 Wash. 433, 443, 249 Pac. 996, iooo (1926).
I-
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pliance. Some constitutions require that bills be read three times at length
in each house; this requirement is one which, if complied with, cumbers
legislatiie procedure, without being of any real value; if the constitution
requires journal entry of three readings in full, such journal entry may be
had but it does not indicate that there were in fact three readings. Requirements as to entry of ayes and nays on final passage of each bill are often
met also by proper journal entries, not by real compliance. Such provisions
are often mandatory, therefore, only to the extent to which they make
necessary formal journal entries of things not in fact done.
(2) Legislative journals are often kept carelessly, and constitute in
many cases the poorest sort of evidence. A statute attacked on the basis
of imperfect journal entries may therefore be held unconstitutional upon
such a basis, not so much because of defect in legislative procedure as because of error or intentional omission by clerical officers.7" If courts go
back of the journals to receive proof as to accuracy of journal entries they
have an interminable task, and they must almost of necessity decline to do
this.

79

(3) In view of the difficulties as to character of evidence which the
journals afford and of the small value of that evidence in establishing actual
compliance with procedural forms, courts may well decline so unprofitable
and ineffective a task as the examination of legislative journals. A definite
and more easily applicable rule is established if the enrolled bill be treated
as conclusive. A frequently presented additional reason for this view is
well stated in an opinion of the Iowa court:
"Indeed, to preserve the harmony of our form of government,
these mandatory provisions must be considered as addressed to the
department which is called upon to perform them and neither of the
other departments will be permitted in any manner to coerce that department into obedience thereto. Those courts which uphold the inquiry as to whether the legislature has observed the mandatory provisions of the constitution necessarily assume that it were safer to
entrust the enforcement of these to the judicial department than the
legislature, and that the judicial department is the only one in which
sufficient integrity exists to insure observance of the provisions of the
constitution. Such an attitude seems intolerable." SO
'Cases are full of comments upon the untrustworthy character of legislative journals.
See State ex rel. Hammond v. Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 151 N. W. 8I (I915); Kelley v. Marron,
2I N. M. 239, 153 Pac. 262 (igiS).
' Taylor v. Beckham, io8 K-. 278, 56 S. W. i77 (igoo) ; Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va.
587. 64 S. E. 845 (19o9) ; SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 46, at §§ 45-48; but see Jackson
Lumber Co. v. Walton County, 95 Fla. 632, 659, 116 So. 771, 781 (1928) ; Hull v. City of
Humboldt, io7 Neb. 326, 186 N. W. 78 (1921) ; In re Petition of Attorney General, supra
note 71.
' State ex rer. Hammond v. Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 1.s6, 151 N. W. 8i, 84 (1915). The
court uses the word "mandatory" in a sense different from that employed in this paper.
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The rule of finality of the enrolled bill is subject to severe test when
there is an allegation and offer to prove that the enrolled bill signed by the
presiding officers of the twb houses is not the measure actually adopted by
the two houses. A variance of the enrolled bill from the measure actually
adopted is normally not shown by any journal entries that are expressly
required by the constitution. The supreme courts of the United States and
of Mississippi and North Carolina met the issue by declining to examine
the journals,"' although in the North Carolina case the journals pretty
clearly showed that the purported act had not been introduced in one house
and had been tabled in the other. An opposite view was taken in the states
of Florida, North Dakota and Illinois, which have not adopted the rule of
finality of the enrolled bill. In North Dakota a bill passed by the house and
amended in the senate was reported back to the house in a form different
from that in which it left the senate, the senate thereupon passing and
entering upon its journals a resolution denouncing the action that had been
taken. Passage of the incorrect bill and its enrollment were successfully
challenged by resort to the journal.8 2 In Florida an act was held bad because containing thirty-three sections which the journals showed to have
been stricken from the bill; 83 and a similar fate befell an Illinois law in
which the bill submitted to the governor omitted fourteen amendments
adopted by the two houses.8 4
Where the violation of a constitutional provision may be determined
from the text of the enactment itself, a simpler problem is presented to the
court. If such a constitutional provision has been violated, the "bill carries
its death warrant in its hand". The distinction between such provisions
and those requiring resort to the journals has been generally recognized.
But the Ohio court draws a different line of distinction. It holds provisions
relating only to the mode of legislation to be directory, as for example,
that requiring the purpose to be clearly stated in the title; violation can here
of course be discovered by examination of the enactment. It holds provisions to be mandatory which affect power or authority to enact a law, as
for example, that requiring a concurrence of a majority of all members
elected to each house for the passage of a statute; violation here can, of
course, be discovered only by an examination of the journals.8 5
With respect to provisions requiring that a bill after passage be signed
by the presiding officer of each house, compliance may be determined by
'Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,

(1836); Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C. 223,

12

22

Sup. Ct. 495 (1892) ; Ex Parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512

S. E. 16 (1895).

State v. Schultz, 44 N. D. 269, 174 N. W. 81 (igig).
State v. Deal, 24 Fla. 293, 4 So. 899 (1888). The court discusses other cases of a sim-

ilar character.
"People v. Leuders, 283 Ill. 287,

119

N. E. 339 (1918).

'Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854) ; State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254,

N. E. 8o7, o8 (1887).
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examining the bill as passed; though the requirement that there be journal
entry of signature in the presence of the house becomes directory in states
that regard the enrolled bill as final.8 6 Some difference of judicial opinion
exists as to whether such provisions should be regarded as mandatory, but
apparently most of the courts passing upon the question have held that such
signatures must be had.87 In several cases the courts say that the enrolled
bill is properly conclusive against attack through an examination of legislative journals, in large part because the constitution requires final authentication to be given to it by the presiding officers. Such authentication is in
these cases regarded as more controlling than the journals. The time of
signature is ordinarily endorsed on the bill, and compliance or non-compliance with constitutional requirements as to such time may be discovered
by examining the enrolled act. The Kansas constitution requires that bills
passed by the two houses shall "within two days thereafter be signed by
the presiding officers and presented to the governor". By some judicial
legerdemain this is construed to be directory as to time of signature by
presiding officers and mandatory as to time of presentation to the governor.8 8 A requirement that no bill be presented to the governor within
two days before adjournment would apparently compel resort to the journals if the governor approved the bill or allowed it to become law without
his signature, and would under such conditions be unenforcible in states
declining to go back of the enrolled bill. 9
The form of the enacting clause can always be determined by examining the enrolled bill, and almost all of the state constitutions prescribe the
form of enacting clause, 90 although in Oklahoma the prescribed form is
held to apply only to bills enacted under the initiative and referendum clause
of the constitution. 91 There is authority for the view that the provision for
' State v. Bacon, 14 S. D. 394, 8s N. W. 6o5 (9oi) ; State v. Moulton, 57 Mont. 414,
189 Pac.
q9 (92o) ; State v. Long, 21 Mont. 26, 52 Pac. 645 (1898).
1
' Lynch v. Hutchinson, 219 Ill. 193, 76 N. E. 370 (i9o6) ; State ex reL. Hammond v.
Lynch, 169 Iowa 148, 151 N. W. 81 (1915) ; State ex reL Attorney General v. Mead, 71 Mo.
266 (1879) ; State ex reL. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, I Pac. 186 (1883) ; State v. Kiesewetter, supra note 85; State ex rel. McClay v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, l02 N. W. 679 (09o5).
But see Commissioners of Leavenworth Co. v. Higginbotham, 17 Kan. 62 (1876), and State
v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., IOO Neb. 700, 704, 161 N. W. 270, 271 (1916).
Scarborough v.
Robinson, 81 N. C. 410 (1879) says that signatures of presiding officers are necessary, but
this is doubted in Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C. 328, 24 S. E. 352 (1896).
' Aiken v. Edwards, 55 Kan. 751, 42 Pac. 366 (895) ; State v. Ryan, 123 Kan. 767, 256
Pac. 8II (1927). In Florida signature by presiding officers is construed to require signature
during the legislative session. Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615 (1922). See
also State v. Ryan, supra, and State ex rel. McClay v. Mickey, supra note 87. With
respect to possible necessity for second authentication on passage over governor's veto, see
State v. State Board, 14o Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (926)'; City of Evansville v. State, II8
Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267 (1888), and State v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (igoi).
"Bender v. State, 53 Ind. 254 (1876) ; State ex reL. Owen v. Fortieth Judicial Circuit et
aL. 174 N. E. 423 (Ind. 1931).
' SUTHERLAND, op. cit. suPra note 46, at §§ 69-72. For enacting clause requirements see
Index Digest of State Constitutions (1915) 832.
" Ex parte Hudson, 3 Okla. Cr. 393, io6 Pac. 54o (igio) ; Turner v. McCain, 26 Okla.
132, 1O9

Pac.

821 (191o).
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an enacting clause is purely directory and that a statute entirely without
one is valid,0 2 but in other cases statutes have been held invalid where there
was no such clause.9 3 An enacting clause is seldom completely absent, and
the more important question is that as to the effect of an enacting clause
varying from that prescribed. The Maryland court has said that the requirement is directory, but in the cases in which this statement was made
the variation from the constitutionally required clause was not material.9 4
In a case in which the legislature used the word "resolved" instead of "be
it enacted", the Mississippi court said:
"There are no exclusive words in the constitution negativing the
use of any other language, and we think the intention will be best
effectuated by holding the clause to be directory only." 95
In a case almost parallel with that of Mississippi, the South Carolina court
held the enacting clause mandatory but took the view that the requirement
had been substantially complied with. A variation justified in Mississippi
on the ground that the provision was directory, was held proper in South
Carolina as substantial compliance with a mandatory requirement. 6 Under
similar conditions the Kansas court was of the opinion that there had been
sufficient compliance.Y In an Illinois case involving much the same facts
as those in Mississippi, South Carolina and Kansas, the enacting clause
was held improper. 98 The Nevada court in 1875 expressed the view that
enacting clause requirements were mandatory and that nothing but the
"very words" of the constitutional clause would suffice, but such a broad
statement was not required, for the enacting clause before the court appeared not to meet even in a substantial manner the constitutional requirement.0 9 In the Tennessee case of State ex rel. Gouge v. Barrow 100 the
words "the state of" were omitted from the constitutionally prescribed
enacting clause, so that the clause read, "Be it enacted by the general assembly of Tennessee." The court took the view that the enacting clause requirement was clearly mandatory, but upheld the statute, saying:
City of Cape Girardeau v. Riley,

Mo.

(1873). See also City of St. Louis v.
Mo. 279, 198 S. W. 830 (917).
"People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich. 595, 77 N. W. 45o (1898) ; Sjoberg v. Security Savings and Loan Association, 73 Minn. 203, 75 N. W. 1116 (1898) ; State v. Patterson, 98 N. C.
66o, 4 S. E. 350 (1887) ; Commonwealth v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 16o Ky. 745, 170
2

52

424

Foster, .52 Mo. 513 (1873). and Creason v. Yardley,

272

S. W. 171 (1914) ; Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, 284-286 (1871).
" McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377 (1868) ; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. State, Iio

Md. 6o8, 73 Atl. 679 (i909). But see Prince George's County v. Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co.,
13 Md. 179, 77 Atl. 433 (91o).

Swann v. Buck, 4o Miss. 268, 293 (1866).
" Smith v. Jennings, 67 S. C. 324, 330-332, 45 S. E.
State v. Knapp, 1O2 Kan. 701, 7I Pac. 639 (I918).
Burritt v. Commissioners,

120

821, 823-824 (1903).

Ill. 322, I N. E. i8o (1887).

"State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, IONev. 250 (1875).
S19 Tenn. 376, 391, 104 S. W. 526, 530 (1907).
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"While some courts of last resort have held, as we do, that the
constitutional provision here invoked is mandatory, yet no case has
been called to our attention where a statute has been held void for a
failure to comply with that provision, when the enacting clause used
necessarily and conclusively expressed the same meaning and had the
same effect, although not literally in the form used."
Perhaps the conclusion may be drawn from the cases on this subject that
the weight of authority gives mandatory effect to constitutional provisions
requiring enacting clauses; but that what is mandatory is a substantial,
not a complete and literal, compliance.' 1 ' The use of the precise language
is not mandatory, but the courts must determine in each case what is substantial compliance. An enacting clause was recently held sufficient which
used the words "be it enacted, etc.," instead of "be it enacted by the general
assembly of the State of Louisiana." 102 Constitutional requirements with
respect to the concluding words of an indictment present a similar
problem. 10 3
" Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, i8o Ky. 6og, 203 S. W. 555 (1918) ; State v. Harries,
47 La. Ann. 386, 17 So. 129 (i895); Fowler v. Stone, 149 Ga. 125, 99 S. E. 291 (1919);
Kefauver v. Sparling, i54 Tenn. 613, 290 S. W. 14 (1926).
City of Shreveport v. Dale, 149 La. 439, 89 So. 408 (1921).
The general view appears to be that provisions prescribing the words with which an
indictment shall conclude are mandatory and an indictment may be bad if it omits the phrase
and contains no equivalent declaration. Revill v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. I, 218 S.W. IO44 (i92o).
Some courts have said that a literal compliance is necessary to a valid indictment. Lemons v.
State, 4 W. Va. 755 (i87o); Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402 (1871) ; Clingan v. State, 135
Miss. 621, ioo So. I85 (1924). The weight of authority is, however, that the provision although mandatory requires only a substantial and not a literal compliance, and immaterial
variations have been permitted. State v. Kean, io N. H. 347 (839) ; Smith v. Jennings, 67
S. C. 324, 332, 45 S.E. 821, 824 (i903) ; Kirkham v. People, 170 Ill. 9, 48 N. E. 465 (i897) ;
People v. Larsen, 265 Ill. 4o6, io6 N. E. 947 (1914); Webb v. Con~monwealth, 122 Va. 899,
94 S.E. 773 (1918). But whaf constitutes a material compliance? The Missouri constitution requires that an indictment conclude, "against the peace and dignity of the state". An
indictment ,for rape in the case of State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 223, 227, 109 S. W. 7o6,
omitted the second "the". The court said: "As heretofore pointed out,
the authorities are all in harmony that the conclusion to the indictment must substantially
conform to the requirements of the constitution, and in all cases where this proposition has
been in judgment before the appellate courts, where the language used was not identical with
the terms prescribed by the constitution, it is significant that the courts have uniformly
pointed out that the terms used were equivalent and in effect and substance embraced the conclusion required by the constitution. . . . This being true, it is plainly manifest that, the
definite article 'the' which should immediately precede the word 'state' being omitted, the
conclusion to the indictment in the case at bar falls far short of indicating the power or
authority against which the facts charged in the body of the indictment constitute an offense.
.. The conclusion prescribed by the constitution of this state is not only one of form,
but as well one of substance: 'substance because the constitution requires it'; and, as was said
by Mr. Bishop in the announcement of the rule, 'whatever alters the substance, even in what
seems unimportant, will render it void.'" A case identical in conclusion with State v. Campbell is Smith v. State, x39 Ala. 115, 36 So. 727 (i9o3). The Missouri court adhered to the
Campbell case for some years (Stone v. Warner, 220 Mo. 23, 119 S. W. 399 (i9o9)), a court
of appeal saying in a dictun that the Campbell case would require it to hold an information
bad if a word in the constitutional formula were misspelled. State v. Calvin, i6o Mo. App.
723, I42 S. W. 470 (I9I2). But in State v. Adkins, 284 Mo. 68o, 225 S. W. 98i (I92O) the
Supreme Court of Missouri expressly overruled the Campbell case, saying that the omission
of "the" was not a fatal defect. The Missouri court said in 1917 that the requirement that
process run in the name of the "State of Missouri" is directory (Creason v. Yardley, 272
Mo. 279, i98 S. W. 83o (1917)), and recently took the view that the conclusion to an indict711, 712-713 (907)

NON-ENFORCIBLE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS

The processes involved in the amendment of state constitutions through
legislative proposal raise issues very similar to those regarding the processes
of legislation. Requirements with respect to constitutional amendments
may be grouped into three classes: (i) those compliance or non-compliance
with which may be determined from the face of the proposed amendment,
as, for example,- the requirement that the proposal shall relate only to one
subject or to but one article of the constitution; (2) those compliance or
non-compliance with which may be determined from an examination of
legislative journals, as, for example, the provision regarding the legislative
vote necessary to propose, and the requirement that a proposed amendment
be "entered" or "enfered in full" on the legislative journals; (3) those compliance or non-compliance with which can be determined in neither of these
ways, but must be discovered by examining other evidence, as, for example,
the requirement that a proposed amendment be published in each county
of a state for three months before the election at which it is to be submitted.
In view of the judicial attitude in many states with respect to processes
of legislation, it would be natural to expect courts to hold some of the provisions as to the amending process to be directory. But aside from two
or three possible exceptions, this seems not to be the case as to any one of
the three classes of provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph. It
has been suggested that the courts sometimes treat immaterial requirements
as if they were directory,'" 4 but even the most liberal cases have hardly
gone as far as this, although there is a dictum to this effect in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Griest: 105
"We think that the provision as to publication three months before the next general election, as prescribed in the first clause of article
18, should be regarded as merely a directory provision, where strict
compliance with a time limit is not essential."
The Idaho court once intimated in a dictum, subsequently questioned, that
though two-thirds of the members of each house did not vote for a proment is a mere matter of form, the omission of which may be cured by amendment after trial
has begun. State v. Riddle, 324 Mo. 96, 23 S. W. (2d) 179 (1929).

The doctrine of substantial compliance may apparently affect a mathematical standard
set up by the constitution. The New York constitution contains the requirement that variations in assembly districts should not exceed the population of a town or block adjoining such
district, but the court said that a trivial and technical difference would be overlooked. Matter
of Dowling, 219 N. Y. 44, 113 N. E. 545 (1916).. And where a constitution required districts to be formed of contiguous territory, the court said that one county was exempt from
the requirement because of its population and geographical location. Matter of Sherrill v.
O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 8i N. E. 124 (197o).
1 See collection of cases in Note (19o7)

IO L. R. A. (N. s.) 149. In statutes, time of
action is often treated as directory, but time of submission of constitutional amendment has
been held mandatory in Alabama and Kansas. Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375
(1921) ; Hooper v. Fox, 2o6 Ala. 371, 89 So. 593 (1921) ; State v. Sessions, 87 Kan. 497, 124
Pac. 403 (1912).
196 Pa. 396, 416, 46 At. 5o5, 51o (Igoo).
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posed amendment, if the measure had been put on the ticket without objection and approved by the people, an estoppel would operate to prevent a
contest of its validity after popular approval, although objections might
have been made at an earlier stage of the proceedings. 106 Recent decisions
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court go farther than the Idaho dictum and
hold that "the approval by the people gives unattackable validity . . . to
constitutional amendments submitted to them"; 'o0 and the California court
has recently made a somewhat similar statement.' 0 8
Although there is a respectable body of decision and of dictum to the
effect that enrolled bills may not be impeached by journal entries, courts
appear in substantially all cases to have examined journals in order to determine whether proposed constitutional amendments have been entered
upon legislative journals as required by provisions for amending constitutions. The Supreme Court of Iowa has indulged in vigorous statements
in favor of the conclusiveness of enrolled bills, but has in the past been
especially strict in resorting to journals to test validity of proposed constitutional amendments. 0 9 It is difficult to determine whether this difference
of attitude on the part of the Iowa court represents a change of view, or a
position that the court should be stricter with respect to constitutional
amendments; or a view that journal entries while untrustworthy to test
legislative enactments, are trustworthy to test steps in the proposal of constitutional change. The South Carolina court, which professes to give
finality to enrolled bills, will examine the journals for the aye and nay vote
on proposed constitutional amendments."-" The Montana court has explicitly stated that the rule as to the finality of enrolled bills does not apply
to proposed constitutional amendments."' A contrary view has been expressed in South Dakota, but does not seem necessary to the decision of
the case. 11 2 Only in New Mexico is it clearly decided that journal entries
will not be permitted to impeach a proposed constitutional amendment. In
Smith v. Lucero 113 the journal of the state senate showed less than a constitutional majority voting for the proposal of an amendment, but the New
Mexico court said:
" Holmberg v. Jones, 7 Idaho 752, 758-759, 65 Pac. 563, 564 (i9oi) ; McBee v. Brady,
15 Idaho 761, ioo Pac. 97 (igog). See ikfra notes I79-I81 for cases in which courts decline
to question important constitutional changes that have once become effective.
' Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 Atl. 263 (924) ; Taylor v. King, 284 Pa. 235,
130 At. 407 (1925).
" Wright v. Jordon, 192 Cal. 704, 221 Pac. 915 (1923).
' Koehler and Lange v. Hill, 6o Iowa 543, 14 N. W. 738 (1883) ; State ex rel. Bailey v.
Brookhart, 113 Iowa 25o, 84 N. W. lO64 (igoi).
'Lucas
v. Barringer, 120 S. C. 68, 112 S. E. 746 (1922) ; Stevenson v. Carrison, 122
S. C. 212, 115 S. E. 251 (1922).
m Martien v. Porter, 68 Mont. 4.50, 465, 219 Pac. 817, 819 (923).
'

State v. Schmidt, 42 S. D. 267, 173 N. W. 838 (1919).
N. M. 411, 419, 168 Pac. 709, 712 (1918). -
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"We are aware that in California, Iowa, Nevada, Missouri and
Montana a different conclusion is reached. In those states and others,
it is held that the journal is the source of evidence as to what was done
in the proposal of constitutional amendments, and that the ordinary
rule that resort cannot be had to the journal to impeach the enrolled
and authenticated act of the Legislature has no application. In those
states, however, they have no such provision as we have in regard to
the enrolling and engrossing of all bills and resolutions and have therefore no such declared policy as to the evidence of legislative action.
Cases from those states are collected in the note to Palatine Insurance
Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 34 Mont. 268, 85 Pac. 1032; 9 Ann.
Cas. 579, 587."
Except as to journal entries in New Mexico and possibly South
Dakota, and attacks after popular approval in Pennsylvania and possibly
California, little or no difficulty presents itself to the courts as to proof of
non-compliance with constitutional requirements in the proposal and adoption of constitutional amendments. The requirements are judicially enforcible. The real issue that presents itself here is, assuming these provisions to be mandatory, does a substantial compliance suffice? Where a
proposed amendment is required to be published for three months before
an election and is actually published for only two Weeks, clearly there is not
a substantial compliance.11 4 But a more doubtful case presents itself when
an amendment is not published until sixty days before election when the
constitution requires ninety days." 5 Where a proposed amendment is required to be published once each week in at least one newspaper in each
county where a newspaper is published, for three months (or for twelve
weeks) before an election, it is clear that there was substantial compliance
even though publication in one county was for one week less than the time
specified. 1"0 The weight of judicial view is that substantial compliance
suffices, although of course there may be difference of view as to what
compliance is substantial.
It may be argued that a constitutional provision is not completely
mandatory unless literal compliance with its terms is judicially enforced,
and this is true. In the cases here discussed the word mandatory has either
one of two meanings: it is employed sometimes in the stricter sense of re"'State

v. Tooker,

N. W.5 6 (1929).

I5 Mont.

8, 37 Pac. 84o (1894) ; State v. Cline, 118 Neb. 150, 224

" McCreery v. Speer, i56 Ky. 783, 162 S.W. 99 (914).
"State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, iio N. W. 1113 (907) ; Russell v.
Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 93, 95, 63 S. W. 849, 85i, 852 (igoi) ; Fahey v. Hackmann, 291 Mo. 351,
370-376, 237 S. W. 752,757-760 (1922); Sandell v. City of Omaha, 115 Neb. 861, 215 N. W.
135 (927) ; Manos v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. 87, 263 S. W. 310 (1924) ; State v.,
Alderson, 49
Mont. 387, 142 Pac. 2IO (1914). Prohibitory Amendment cases, 24 Kan. 700, 7IO (1881).
See also State v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 Pac. i9o (1893), and Commonwealth v. Griest, i96
Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505 (i9oo).
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quiring literal compliance; and at others is used to denote a compliance not
necessarily literal, but at least substantial. Statements in the cases frequently go farther than is necessary to dispose of the issue involved. With
respect to mandatory and directory provisions (whether in the legislative
and amending processes or elsewhere), judicial statements which approach
the character of dicta may be grouped into three classes: (i) Cases in
which there has been a substantial compliance with constitutional forms,
but in which the court said that such forms were directory. The same
result would have been reached had the court said that the form was
mandatory, but with substantial compliance sufficing. (2) Cases in which
it is assumed that a requirement is mandatory and the question is one as to
whether it shall be liberally or strictly construed. Shall a requirement of
"entry" of a proposed constitutional amendment be construed to require
"full entry"? The arguments for a liberal interpretation in favor of the
legislature in such a case are much the same as those supporting a view
that formal provisions are directory, but statements sometimes found in
such cases that such provisions are directory are unnecessary to the decision
of the issue before the court. The issue is that as to the construction of a
mandatory requirement, although as to journal entry it is sometimes bound
up with the question whether (assuming a certain construction of a mandatory requirement) substantial or literal compliance with that requirement
is necessary." 7 (3) Cases in which there was no substantial compliance
with constitutional provisions, but in which the court says that a literal
compliance is necessary. The result in such cases may equally well be based
upon the argument that the constitutional provisions involved are mandatory
to the extent of requiring substantial compliance, but that substantial compliance was not had.lls
Judge Cooley's language 1' upon directory and mandatory provisions
has often been quoted:
n' Some constitutions require "full" entry--others require entry. Montana requires that
proposed amendments agreed to by the two houses "be entered in full on their respective
journals". Full entry on the house journals alone was held substantial compliance. Martien
v. Porter, 68 Mont 45o, 219 Pac. 817 (1923). Iowa require9 entry only, and full entry on

the journals of the two houses with a slight and immaterial variation between the two was
held fatal. See supra note io9. The NVisconsin court at first held entry to mean entry in full,
but on rehearing, held an identifying entry sufficient. State v. Marcus, i6o Wis. 354, 152
N. W. 419 (i91s) (three judges dissenting). For earlier cases, see DODD, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 144-148. Later cases in New York, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Utah, Nevada, Oregon and Washington hold entry to require only an identifying reference. Browne v. City
of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211 (1925) ; State v. Hall, 44 N. D. 459, 7' N. W.
213 (1918) ; Lee v. Price, .54 Utah 474, i8i Pac. 948 (I919) ; Ex parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472,
I8i Pac. 319 (I919) ; Boyd v. Olcott, io2 Ore. 327, 202 Pac. 43i (i92i) ; Gottstein v. Lister,
88 Wash. 462, 467, 153 Pac. 595, 597 (i915). A contrary view was taken in McAdams v.
Henley, i69 Ark. 97, 273 S. W. 355 (1925) which gives a good brief review of the cases.
"1State ex reL. Chase v. Rogers, io Nev. 25o (1875). See also State v. Tooker, I5 Mont.
8, 37 Pac. 840 (1894) ; and Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S. W. 457 (1888).
11 Op. cit. .rupra note 3, at isg-i6o.
See pages 154-164 for Cooley's full discussion of
this subject.
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"But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they
venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory
statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do not
usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when
such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and
they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power
to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn
and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and
fix those unvarying rules by which all departments of the government
must at all times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing
mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper
dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of
ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded
as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument
which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the
governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the
power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign
people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or
modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at
least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only; and we impute to the people a want
of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an
instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other
end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves
in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as
possible to implication."
Judge Cooley apparently used the word "mandatory" as equivalent to
a requirement of strict compliance. It is hardly possible to agree with his
conclusion regarding the "high importance" attached by the people to some
of the formal provisions in a state constitution. Examination of a modem
state constitution (or of a state constitution at the time when Judge Cooley
wrote) might perhaps have led the learned author to the view that there had
been a "lowering of the proper dignity of such an instrument", if it be
assumed that a state constitution should contain only matters of high importance.12 0 Many of the provisions establish nothing of principle, and
oftentimes their violation can in no way injure either private rights or any
well-considered public policy. The provision may be one purely of detail,
frequently immaterial in itself, except for the fact that it is in the constitution, and its violation may be a mere harmless inadvertence. The form of
an enacting clause required by a'constitution is almost of necessity somewhat accidental, and the same statement applies to constitutional prescrip" As to state constitutions such an assumption runs contrary to the facts. See Dodd,
The Function of a State Constitution (1915) 30 POL. ScI. Q. 201.
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tions as to the form of judicial process. It is of little material importance
whether we have, "Be it enacted by the general assembly" or "Be it enacted
by the people, represented in the general assembly".
An immaterial matter does not become important because it is found
in a state constitution. And where a constitutional provision requires notice
in a certain form for the protection of private rights, the courts will properly refuse to require compliance with such form, where the private rights
have in fact been adequately protected. A similar point of view would
support judicial disregard of a constitutional provision requiring publication of proposed constitutional amendments for twelve weeks in each county,
if it could be shown that under state law copies of the proposed amendments,
together with arguments opposing and supporting them, were actually placed
121
in the hands of each voter.
But in cases where constitutional provisions are capable of judicial
enforcement, no large group of provisions has been held purely directory,
although in a number of cases substantial compliance has been regarded as
sufficient. The attitude of the courts in this matter is based in part upon
their assumption that they are the only appropriate constitutional guardians,
and that provisions are likely to be ignored if committed to the uncontrolled
discretion of legislatures.
"To say that a provision is directory, seems, with many persons,
to be equivalent to saying that it is not law at all. That this ought not
to be so must be conceded; that it is so, we have abundant reason and
good authority for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is
to be enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the
legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the
more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it." 122
There is much truth to this statement though its principle does not apply
(as courts seem to think) to legislatures alone. Constitutional provisions,
mandatory in form, directed to the courts, appear just as likely to be disregarded because they are not made obligatory through compulsion external
to the judicial department.
Yet, of course, the legislature is a body which must to a greater extent
act affirmatively, and it therefore has a greater opportunity to ignore limitations upon it which may be regarded as purely directory. In so far as
courts hold to be directory constitutional provisions which they may, if
they desire, hold mandatory, they are, of course, taking a view favorable
to legislatures, and raising implications favorable to legislative power; implications in this respect to some extent (though very slightly) modify the
1' Riesteterer v. Horton Land and Lumber Co., i6o Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238 (19o);
Wright v. Jordan, 192 Cal. 704, 221 Pac. 915 (1923).
lMay
v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 (1883) quoted in Commonwealth v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 16o
Ky. 745, 750, 170 S. W. 171, 173 (1914).
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general tendency to raise implications against state legislative power. 12 3 In

the development of constitutional texts, courts have been little encouraged
to hold limitations upon legislatures to be directory rather than mandatory.
The California Supreme Court originally held a constitutional provision
regarding titles of acts to be directory, but changed its view because of the
insertion into the California constitution of 1879 of a declaration that:
"The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise."
Since 1879 six other states have followed California's example of inserting
mandatory clauses into their constitutions.' 24 Such provisions have been
referred to in several cases as having a decisive effect upon judicial construction of constitutional provisions.12 These declarations still leave it to
the court to determine whether "mandatory" means literal or substantial
compliance.
The largest single class of directory constitutional provisions is that
relating to legislative procedure, and these provisions are not judicially
enforcible primarily because no proof is permitted as to compliance or noncompliance with them. They may become mandatory at any time, if a
court refusing to permit examination of journals changes its view as to
this matter, but the tendency appears to be to give less rather than more
weight to legislative journals, though such a tendency has had little influence
as yet in the proposal of constitutional amendments.
PROVISIONS MANDATORY

IN

FORM BUT DIRECTORY

IN

FACT

State constitutions have tended to contain an increasing number of
provisions directing the legislature to take certain actions. For example,
the constitution of Oklahoma provides that the legislature "shall establish
and maintain a system of free public schools"; and "shall" make provision
for decennial revisions of the statutes; and shall make a legislative reapportionment each ten years. There is no power in the court nor in any other
department of the state government to compel affirmative legislative action,
and provisions depending upon such action must to the extent of such dependence be directory. The South Dakota constitution required the legislature to provide a census in 1895, and to make a legislative apportionment
on the basis of such census. The court of that state said:
Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constifutionai Law

L. 1. 137.
'

(i919) 29

YALE

Montana (1889), North Dakota (1889), Washington (1889), Utah (1895), South

Carolina (189.5), Arizona (igo). See also the Alabama constitutional provision as to
notice of special legislation, supra note 45.
State v. Tooker, 1.5 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 84o (1894) ; Smith v. Jennings, 67 S. C. 324, 330,
45 S. E. 821, 823 (1903).
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"The provisions of this section are in their nature mandatory to
the legislature to enact the specified legislation. But under our system
of government there is no power to compel the legislative department
to enact laws. Constitutions may restrict legislative powers, and declare what laws shall not be valid; but from the very nature of legislative power, its exercise in a particular case must depend upon the
volition of the legislature." 126
To say that such provisions are "in their nature mandatory" or obligatory
is but another way of saying that they rest in the uncontrolled discretion
of the legislature.
Efforts to obtain judicial enforcibility for such provisions have uniformly failed. The Washington court was unsuccessfully asked in 1916
to hold an existing apportionment made in 19O1 invalid because the legislature -had not performed the constitutional duty of making a new apportionment. 12 7 In three successive cases the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to consider: (i) mandamus to compel apportionment; (2) injunction to
restrain payment of legislative salaries on the ground that the legislature
had no lawful existence; and (3) quo warranto to test the lawful existence
1 28
of the legislature.
Under some conditions, however, it is possible to obtain judicial enforcibility of requirements as to affirmative legislative action. Where the
requirement relates to form of legislative action, this is clearly possible, and
the same thing is true to some extent where the requirement is bound up
more or less intimately with action which the legislature must in fact take,
even though it cannot be coerced into doing so. Provisions that the legislature shall appropriate money according to certain forms are not affirmatively enforcible in one sense, for the legislature cannot be coerced into
making appropriations, 129 but if appropriations must in fact be made, the
constitutional forms of appropriation become then judicially enforcible.
The same statement applies to formal requirements in connection with any
necessary legislative action. The New Jersey constitution requires public
notice of intention to apply for local or special legislation, and provides that:
"The legislature, at the next session after the adoption hereof [of
this constitutional amendment], and from time to time thereafter, shall
prescribe the time and mode of giving such notice, the evidence thereof,
and how such evidence shall be preserved."
' In re State Census, 6 S. D.

54o,

62 N. W.

129

(1895).

See also Gillinwater v. Missis-

sippi and Ati. R. R. Co., 13 Ill. I, 6 (1851).
1'- State v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1g6).

'Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 51o, 152 N. E- 557 (1926) ; Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437,
164 N. E. 665 (1928) ; People v. Blackvell, 342 Ill. 223, x73 N. E. 750 (1930).
12 See State ex tel. Sutherland v. Nye, 23 Nev. 99, 42 Pac. 866 (1895).
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The court could not compel the legislature to prescribe the required rules,
but if the legislature had failed to do so,' 3 0 the court could have said that
no local or special law would be treated as valid unless notice were proved
in a manner prescribed by legislative action; the legislature would then have
to act if it were to continue to exercise power to pass local or special laws.
Other illustrations suggest themselves, that are further removed from
the field of legislative procedure. The Mississippi constitution required
that "the legislature shall provide by law for determining contested elections". Now a legislature must almost necessarily pass laws providing for
elections, and it would have been possible for a court to say that an election
law is invalid unless it complies with the constitutional command regarding
contested elections. Yet a court would be very unlikely to say this. Upon
the issue here suggested the Mississippi court said:
"Suppose the legislature had failed to provide by law for contesting any elections, would any contend that the elections failed of
their effect, and the popular will should be defeated, either by leaving
offices vacant or by continuing the incumbents in office until the constitutional requirement should be obeyed? This would involve consequences not to be tolerated, and is suggestive of the unsoundness of
any view which makes them possible. We reject any such view and
hold that the provision of the constitution under consideration, like
many others in it, is addressed to the legislature and mandatory upon
it, but that it ends with that department.

,,131

Suppose, again, that a constitutional provision should say that the
legislature shall enact a law permitting the state to be sued upon claims
against it, and that the legislature actually enacted such a law. The legislature now repeals the law without substituting anything in its place. It
would be possible for a court to make the requirement to some extent mandatory (assuming the legislature had once acted affirmatively), by saying
that a repeal was invalid which resulted in a complete negation of the constitutional command. But it is extremely unlikely that a court would take
such a view. 132
Some element of actual compulsion presents itself with respect to
legislative apportionments, if an alternative plan may be employed, should
the legislature fail to reapportion at the proper time, even though the alternative plan is itself not subject to judicial enforcement. Such a plan
was unsuccessfully employed in Missouri for a time, and has been adopted
in California. Congress, in 1929, provided for executive action in con"'The legislature did make the required provision. Passaic County v. Stevenson, 46
N. J. L. I73, 186 (1884).
'Dichum in Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59, 70, 8 So. 2oi (i886).
"See the view as to language held directory in form, in Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 23I
(1875).
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gressional reapportionment, should the two houses fail to act, and the
present congressional apportionment is the result of executive rather than
legislative action. The constitutions of Ohio and Maryland prescribe the
rules of legislative apportionment, and commit power to act to executive
officers.

1 33

Although there are elements of judicial enforcibility in certain constitutional provisions requiring affirmative legislative action, these elements
are usually not present, and where they are, courts are loath to take advantage of them. In general, therefore, constitutional provisions that the
legislature "shall" do a certain thing are equivalent to statements that the
legislature "may" or "shall have power".13 4 The Federal Constitution provides that Congress "on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of
the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments" to the
constitution, but there is no compulsion upon Congress to call a convention.
If the people in framing a constitution or a constitutional amendment
desire to make sure that a provision will be effective without reliance upon
action within the uncontrolled discretion of the legislature, they must put
the matter into the constitution in such detail and in such form that it becomes self-executing. 35 The constitution itself may, through self-executing
provisions, look directly to the people whose actions are to be controlled,
and not to the people indirectly through a requirement of legislative action.
A popular vote in New York in 1886 was overwhelmingly in favor of
calling a constitutional convention, but owing to political differences between
the legislature and the governor the convention was not assembled until
1894. The New York constitution of 1894 provides for the assembling
of a convention without legislative action.
A constitutional amendment for the initiative and referendum, adopted
by Utah in 19oo, adopted these institutions under certain conditions "as
may be provided by law". Nothing could be done until the legislature acted,
'
DoDD, op. cit. supra note 18, at 151. In Massachusetts apportionment of representatives within counties is committed to county commissioners in each county, and the courts
will enforce affirmative action. Merrill v. County Commissioners of Essex, 257 Mass. 184,
153 N. E. 562 (1926). The same statement applies to the apportionment of assemblymen by
the board of aldermen of the City of New York. Matter of Livingston, 96 Misc. 341, i6o
N. Y. Supp. 462 (1916).
' For a view that in a constitution "may" should not be construed as mandatory, see
State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152 (9o.5).
33 "There appear to be three classes of provisions in the constitution.
The first class embraces constitutional provisions negative and prohibitory in their character, and are selfexecuting. . . . The second class embraces such constitutional provisions as require certain provisions to be had in order to render valid the enactment of laws or the accomplishment
of the purposes of the legislature. These provisions must be substantially complied with, or
the laws enacted or the proceedings taken may be invalid. The third class embraces provisions requiring the legislature to enact certain laws, but prescribes no penalty for a failure to
perform the duty". In re State Census, 6 S. D. 540, 62 N. W. 129 (1895).
Judge Cooley well states the test of self-executing provisions: "A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced ...
" Op.

cit. s4tpra note 3, at i67. See ibid. 165-7L
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and the legislature took no action until 1917. All of the initiative and
referendum amendments adopted by other states since this time except that
of Idaho in 1912 provide the details for the operation of the system, while
at the same time expressly permitting legislation to supplement these provisions; some expressly say that the constitutional provisions shall be selfexecuting. Constitutional changes with respect to the process of amending
the constitution of North Dakota omitted certain details (which were apparently not fatal to the self-executing character of the provision), and did
not provide expressly that the constitutional terms should be self-executing;
the North Dakota court, unnecessarily, held that the provisions required
legislative action to make them operative, but later changed its position,
saying that there were no presumptions in favor of the necessity of legislative action.' 30 The North Dakota court quoted the Supreme Court of
California with approval, to the effect that:
"Now the presumption is the reverse. Recently adopted state
constitutions contain extensive codes of laws, intended to operate directly upon the people as statutes do. To say that these are not selfexecuting may be to refuse to execute the sovereign will of the people.
The different policy requires a different ruling. I should say the rule
now is, that such constitutional provisions must be held to be selfexecuting when they can be given reasonable effect without the aid of
legislation, unless it clearly appears that such was not intended." '37
Self-executing provisions are, of course, also limitations (and mandatory limitations) upon the legislature, in that they occupy a field previously occupied by the legislature, and in that the legislature may not run
counter to them. Implications against legislative power are easily drawn
from such provisions. When the constitution directly legislates it reduces
legislative power often to as great an extent as when it directly prohibits or
restricts legislative action.
Constitutional provisions to the effect that the legislature "shall" take
certain action or that it "may" or "shall have power" to do certain things
in some cases affirmatively enlarge legislative powers beyond those previously recognized by the courts. Several constitutional amendments were
adopted by the State of Ohio in 1912 for the express purpose of permitting
legislative action in cases where the courts had held such action improper.' 38
While provisions requiring affirmative legislative action have at times
been adopted primarily for the purpose of enlarging legislative power or of
emphasizing the existence of such power, and may not be enforced through
f State v. Hall, 35 N. D. 34, 135 N. W. 281 (1916) ; State v. Hall, 44 N. D. 459, I71
N. W. 213 (919).
On self-executing provisions see also Parwal Investment Co. v. State,
7r Okla. MI, 175 Pac. 514 (i9i8), and Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. Xo5, 289 S. W. 363 (1927).
'4 Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432, 439, 69 Pac. 77, 78 (i9o2).
" DODD, op. cit. supra note 18, at 125.
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coercion upon the legislature, they are by implication held in many cases to
impose restrictions upon legislative action and are to that extent mandatory.
So, if a constitution says that the legislature "shall" make an apportionment
each ten years, courts may not compel the legislature to make such an apportionment, but they may say that the affirmative command contains a
negative and mandatory prohibition against making an apportionment
oftener than once in the ten year period.' 3 9 Such mandatory limitations
are, however, drawn with equal ease from provisions that are affirmatively
directory ("may") as from those that are affirmatively mandatory ("shall").
A clear illustration presents itself in the case of Scott v. Flowers.14'" The
Nebraska constitution provided that the legislature may establish reform
schools for children under the age of sixteen. This was clearly directory
not only in effect, but also in form, yet the court drew from it a mandatory
limitation against providing reform school facilities for children of more
than sixteen. The theory that a state constitution is a limitation
and not a grant of power no longer holds when many provisions
are inserted into a constitution for the purpose of making sure that a power
will not be judicially denied. In recognition of this fact, the framers of
the Oklahoma constitution of 1907 inserted a statement that "any specific
grant of authority in this Constitution, upon any subject whatever, shall
not work a restriction, limitation or exclusion of such authority upon the
same or any other subject or subjects whatsoever." 141
POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND OTHER ISSUES OF WHICH THE COURTS
DECLINE JURISDICTION

The term "political question" is employed to designate certain types
of functions committed to the political organs of government (the legislative and executive departments, or either of them), and not subject to
judicial investigation.' 42 Where a function is in terms committed exclusively
and finally to another department of government, judicial control over such
function is expressly or impliedly negatived. The same principle applies
where the Constitution of the United States commits a function exclusively
to a state body or a state officer. In Kentucky v. Dennison the United
States Supreme Court said that the performance of the duty of one state
upon proper demand to deliver up a fugitive from justice to another state
"is left to depend on the fidelity of the state executive to the compact
entered into with the other states when it adopted the Constitution of the
People v. Carlock, 198 Ill. I5O, 65 N. E. io9 (1902) ; Dowell v. McLees, 199 Cal. 144,
248 Pac. 511 (1926).
'm6o Neb.675, 84 N. W. 8i (igoo).
'
Oklahoma constitution, art. s, § 36. Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. District Court, 71
Okla. 32, 174 Pac. 1o56 (i9i8).
"' For issues similar to "political questions" in the sense in which that term is used above,
see a statement of English Law, MOORE, ACT OF STATE IN ENGLISH LAW (i9o6).
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United States and became a member of the Union." 143 Political questions,
properly so called, are ones committed to other than judicial organs of government, not in terms excluding judicial control, but with respect to issues
so distinctly political in character that courts regard it as improper to seek
to exercise control, although in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court may feel
1 44
called upon to determine issues equally as delicate as those which it avoids.
So far as concerns the national government, the subject of political
questions has been frequently and adequately discussed. 4 5 The conduct of
foreign relations is, of course, entirely removed from judicial control. 1 46
Of a similar type is the question as to the propriety of calling out the militia
in any case. The political relationships between state and nation are also
matters with respect to which an attempt to exercise judicial authority
might well be futile. So the United States Supreme Court declined to
exercise jurisdiction upon application for an injunction presenting the question of the political status of the state of Georgia, saying that "the rights,
for the protection of which our authority is invoked, are the rights of
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence
as a state, with all its constitutional powers and privileges." 147
Under the Constitution "the United States shall guarantee to every
state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and on the application of the legislature, or of
the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence." The courts have no control over military forces, and the duty
to protect from invasion or domestic violence is necessarily imposed upon
other organs of government. Where domestic violence is due to two contending bodies, each claiming to be the legitimate state government, the
national organs, whose function it is to protect from domestic violence,
must necessarily determine which of such bodies is the legitimate one. 148
And the guaranty of a republican form of government is one to be enforced,
not by the judicial, but by the political organs of the national government. 149
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, io9 (U. S. i86o).
a"The court has decided state boundary disputes presenting serious problems and has
determined when a state is within the Union. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1869).
The case of Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522 (1931) involved issues as
serious as some that have been avoided.
"' For one of the most recent discussions, see 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONTSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1929) 1326-1338. The problem is adequately discussed by Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts (924) 8 MINN. L. Ray. 485. See also Finkelstein,
Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 H,%Rv. L. REV. 338; Weston, Political Questions (1925)
38 HARv. L. REv. 296; Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation (925)
39
HArv. L. REV. 221.
I, See recent discussions in Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. :259
(1923) ; United States v. Snyder, 44 Fed. (2d) 895 (Ct. of App. D. C. 193o).
1 Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 5o (U. S. 1868).
" Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I (U. S. 1849).
"'Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. i18, 32 Sup. Ct. 224 (1912);
State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. 708 (1916) ; Akron Park District v. Ohio, 281 U. S. 74, 50 Sup. Ct. 228 (1930).
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Most of the questions just referred to are ones that present themselves
in the national government, but not in the states. Questions of foreign
relations and of relations between state and nation in the United States are
ones to be settled by national, not by state, authority. Political questions
are therefore relatively much less important irr state constitutional law.
But questions do present themselves in the states somewhat similar to
those in the national government. For example, state courts have said that
it is improper for them to contradict assertions made by the political organs
of government regarding state boundaries.150 And several state courts
have taken a strong position against judicial interference with acts undertaken through state military power, in connection with the suppression of
disorder.' 5 ' The question whether a state capital is being properly removed
from one location to another appears, however, to be open to state judicial
inquiry.

15 2

If observance of the federal provision guaranteeing a republican form
of government is not subject to inquiry in federal courts, it would seem
more clearly beyond the authority of state courts. Yet early cases holding
local option laws unconstitutional were based to some extent on the theory
that such laws violated a guaranty of republican form of government, and
some modern state cases on the initiative, referendum and recall have discussed and decided issues as to what constitutes a republican form, under
the federal guaranty. These state decisions have been liberal in their definition of a republican form of government but the courts have decided the
question, 53 and a political question is properly one which the courts decline
to discuss, because of its character. We have a somewhat curious situation
of an issue of federal guaranty being political from the standpoint of
federal courts, and judicial from the standpoint of some state courts. In
a proposed constitution submitted to and rejected by the people of Illinois
in 1922, a provision was inserted that "the republican form of government
of this state shall never be abandoned, modified or impaired". Had this
provision been adopted, the question of its observance would apparently
have been subject to judicial control. The purpose may have been merely
to repeat the federal guaranty, but state enforcement of such a guaranty
Bedel v. Loomis, ix N. H. 9 (184o) ; State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873).
" FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RuLr (i930) 152-157, and articles by Professor H.
W. Ballantine, Martial Law (1912) 12 CoL L. REV. 529; Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal (1915) i4 MicH. L. REv. 102, 197. See also Note (1913) 45 L. R. A. (N. s.)
996 to the West Virginia case of Mays v. Brown (1912). But see also Ex parte Lavinder,
88 W. Va. 713, 1o8 S. E. 428 (192).
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Huston, 27 Okla. 6o6, 113 Pac. i9o (191o). See
also Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875).
'Kiernan
432, 138

v. Portland, 57 Ore. 454, 111 Pac. 379 (191o) ; Bonner v. Belsterling, io4

S. W. 571 (1911) ; Hile v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. i44, 141 N. E. 35 (1923) ;
State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 452, 143 N. W. 796, 799 (1913). See also
Note (19o8) 4 MicH. L. REV. 304.
Tex.
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would have presented none of the political problems involved in enforcing
a federal guaranty with respect to the states.
A situation akin to that presented by political questions arises with
respect to judicial control over the heads of state and national executive
departments. The principle is well established that, where a discretion is
conferred upon an administrative officer, whether superior or inferior, the
courts will not interfere to control the manner of exercising that discretion
(unless in case of fraud or abuse of power). The discretion is one of
another department, and only action resulting from its abuse is judicially
cognizable. This principle applies to a subordinate administrative officer
as well as to the governor or the president. But with respect to the head
of an executive department a further principle has been adopted by many
courts; mandamus will not issue to compel even the performance of a purely
ministerial function by the governor, 1 4 and in some states the fact that the
governor is a member of a board will cause the courts to decline to issue
mandamus to the board.:" 5 In the states adopting the principle that action
of the governor, even though ministerial, cannot be judicially coerced, a
function committed to the governor personally by the constitution, or in
which the governor's action is necessary under the constitution, is incapable
of judicial control. Substantially the same statement may be made regarding the injunction, for the more general view is that the courts may not
enjoin actions by the governor; 1" here, however, the freedom from judicial
control is not so great, for if the governor's action must be through his
subordinates, an injunction may issue against them, though cases in West
Virginia and Pennsylvania suggest that immunity extends to officers acting
under the governor's directions.
Until recently the constitution of Missouri provided under certain conditions for a senatorial apportionment board composed of the governor,
secretary of state and attorney general. The governor declined to act with
the other two, who together then prepared an apportionment; but the constitution provided that such apportionment should come into effect "upon
the proclamation of the governor". The governor declined to proclaim
the apportionment and the court refused to coerce him,1 7 although it said
I Notes (i9o7) 6L. R. A. (. S.) 750; (i9ii) 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 355; and (1917) L.
R. A. i917F, 774. Myers, Mandamus against a Governor (905) 3 M Hi. L. REv. 631. But
see Winsor v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 504, 243 Pac. 407 (1926) ; State v. Henderson, i99 Ala. 244,
74 So. 344 (1917) ; Gordon v. Morrow, i86 Ky. 713, 218 S. W. 258 (1920).
People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunne, 258 Ill. 441,

1oi

N. E. 56o (1913).

But see Brunson v.

Commissioners of Land Office, i45 Okla. 219, 292 Pac. 562 (1930).

I Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875) ; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Huston, 27
Okla. 6o6, 113 Pac. igo (i9)
; State v. District Court, 156 Minn. 270, 194 N. W. 630
(1923) ; Putnam v. Norblad, 293 Pac. 940 (Ore. 193i). As to the'issue of judicial process
to the governor in general, see Thompson v. German Valley Railroad Co., 22 N. J. Eq. ii
(187I), and Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
For a failure
'State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W. 40 (912).
of a legislative appropriation through refusal of the governor to authorize payment, see State
ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 12o Mo. 428, 2. S. W. 376 (1894).
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that the two could lawfully act in making the apportionment after the
governor's refusal to join with them. In Oklahoma an injunction was
sought to prevent a removal of the state capital by the governor and other
state officers; proceeding by injunction against the governor was declined,
but as to other officers jurisdiction was taken and the matter determined
on its merits.' 5" It is usually possible, if the governor acts through subordinates, to contest his action judicially by mandamus, injunction, or civil
action against the subordinates. Where the power, and under the constitution, a duty to act, is committed to the governor alone, no remedy may be
had against his inaction (in the states declining to mandamus him) and a
duty imposed upon him in mandatory constitutional language is directory
in effect, just as is mandatory language addressed to the legislature.
Elections are regarded as so far political in their nature that courts
will not ordinarily interfere with them by injunction, and some courts apply
this rule strictly with respect to the submission of questions to popular vote
by legislative action. Such a vote is by some courts regarded as involving
purely political rights-by others as a step in the legislative process. 16 0
Jurisdiction over election contests is normally statutory, and by statute the
Supreme Court of South Dakota is given jurisdiction over election contests
for state offices. 160 By statute in Wisconsin power is committed to the
courts to determine whether expenses of an election are excessive, and in
the exercise of this power the courts may declare an election for governor
void.' 1 ' But, in the absence of statute, judicial inquiry will often be made
as to rights depending upon an election, where the determination has not
16 2
been exclusively committed to other departments by the constitution.

State courts have passed upon the issue presented by two contesting legislative bodies, 6 3 and upon contests regarding an election to the governorship.'1 4 The Nebraska court assumed jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of a candidate for governor who had been declared elected by the
'a State ex rel. Attorney General v. Huston, 27 Okla. 6o6, 113 Pac. 19o (191o).
In West
Virginia judicial power was denied even as against officers acting under direction of the
governor. Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (875).
' 'McAlister v. State, 95 Okla. 200, 219 Pac. 134 (x923) and Note (1924) 33 A. L. R.
1376; McAlister v. State, 96 Okla. 143, 221 Pac. 779 (1923) ; Spies v, Byers, 287 I1. 627, 122
N. E. 841 (1919) ; State ex rel. Stokes et al. v. Roach, 269 Mo. 500, 190 S. W. 277 (1916)
Weinland v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. IO, 121 N. E. 816 (1918); Gaskins v. Dorsey, 15o Ga. 638,
1o4 S. E. 433 (92O).
" Harries v. McCrea, 62 Utah 348, 219 Pac. 533 (1923) ; Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah

452, 25o Pac. 1O49 (1926) ; Warren v. Brown, 234 N. W. 38 (S. D. 1930).
State v. Kohler, 2oo Wis. 58, 228 N. W. 895 (930).
'

COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1408 et seq. State v. Circuit Court, 178 Wis. 468, 19o

N. W. 563 (1922).
* Prince v. Skillen, 71 Me. 361 (i88o) ; In re Gunn, 5o Kan. 155, 32 Pac. 470 (1893).
Attorney General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 (1856) ; State v. Bulkeley, 61 Conn. 287, 23
Atl. 186 (1892).
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two houses of the legislature. 165

And the Texas court recently passed
upon the qualifications of a candidate for governor of that state, although
6 G
saying that the matter was not one for judicial determination.
In many fields the tendency of state courts has been to narrow the
scope of what might otherwise have been regarded as political questions.
Most of the state constitutions prescribe, often in a good deal of detail,
methods of legislative apportionment; the view that an apportionment when
made is not subject to judicial control has been rejected by state courts with
the possible exception of Virginia, the question of difference in the decisions being that as to the strictness or liberality of judicial attitude toward
legislative apportionments. 16 7 The constitutions of New York and Oklahoma expressly provide for judicial review of apportionments. Delay in
the contest of apportionments may, however, introduce a political element
16 8
of which the courts will take cognizance.
In Luther v. Borden,169 Chief Justice Taney said:
"In forming the constitutions of the different states after the
Declaration of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always
determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the state, and the judicial power has followed
its decision."
The view recently expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Leser
v. Garnett 170 is in accord with Chief Justice Taney's statement, and at one
time it seemed possible that this view might prevail in state courts,' 71 but
state constitutional provisions regarding constitutional amendment have become judicially cognizable, except as to steps in such process committed
exclusively to other departments. 172 The determination of what ought to
go into an amendment (including of course the regulation by amendment
of matters previously regulated by statute) is necessarily committed to the

11 State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N. V. 739 (I89I), rev'd on the question of citizenship,
Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 12 Sup. Ct. 375 (1892).
"~Dickson v. Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 26.5 S. W. 1012 (1924).
"See People v. Carlock, 198 Ill. I5o, 6. N. E. 1O9 (i92), and cases cited in State
ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 473, 146 S. W. 40, 53 (1912). RENscH, AmzaICAN LEGISLATURES AND I4GISLATIVE MF-THODS (1913) 16-212. That a congressional determination of the time when an apportionment comes into effect is political, see State v. Boyd,
36 Neb. 181, 54 N. W. 252 (1893). Upon judicial control of apportionments, see Wise v.
Bigger, 79 Va. 269 (1884).
" See infra notes 183-185.
'7 How. 1, 39 (U. S. 1849).
ITO258 U. S. 130, 42 Sup. Ct. 217 (1922).

' DODD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 209-215.
a review of cases upon amending process and a comment upon the commission to
other departments of functions connected therewith, see McConaughy v. Secretary of State,
io6 Minn. 392, 410, i19 N. W. 408, 415 (1909). See also Boyd v. Olcott, I2 Ore. 3o7, 2o2
Pac. 431 (1921).
'"For
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discretion of the bodies proposing amendments, though an opposing view
173
is taken in an indefensible decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.
In the field of judicial non-enforcibility, interesting problems present
themselves with respect to cases involving normally justiciable issues but
in which the courts either decline to take jurisdiction or decline to pass
upon certain of the issues submitted to them. The United States Supreme
Court properly avoided the decision of political questions in Mississippi v.
Johnson 17 and Georgia v. Stanton,"'" but when proper parties appeared,
the avoidance of a decision regarding the constitutionality of the reconstruction acts was accomplished in the end only by a statutory change in
the appellate jurisdiction of the court.' 6 It may be, as Professor Corwin
has ably argued, that there are no constitutional limits upon the power of
Congress to spend money,' 77 but the judicial settlement of this constitutional
issue seems improbable so long as the United States Supreme Court adheres
to the view that neither a state nor an individual has a sufficient interest to
78
raise the question for judicial decision.1
But in an even larger group of cases, courts decline to pass upon constitutional questions although the issues are justiciable and have been raised
by proper parties. This is accomplished by applying to certain constitutional
questions a judicial principle similar in some respects to a statute of
limitations.
There are some cases in which constitutional changes, once consummated, become so political in their aspects that a court will decline to interfere. In both Kentucky and Virginia effort was made to contest complete
constitutions already in operation, and courts declined to inquire into irregularities in the action leading to the adoption of such constitutions. 79
Once a government is in operation, a court, constituting part of the organization thereunder, could hardly declare that government ineffective. Consummation of. a change may in such a case make the question political,
although it may properly have been subject to judicial cognizance had the
issue been presented earlier. Somewhat the same situation presents itself
' State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 13o S. W. 68) (igio), abandoned in
part in State ex rel. Stokes et al. v. Roach, supra note 159. See also Livermore v. Waite,
io2 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424 (1894). The United States Supreme Court has wisely rejected
contentions that would require judicial inquiry into the proper content of a constitutional
amendment. United States v. Sprague, 51 Sup. Ct. 220 (U. S. 1931i.
7'44 Wall. 475 (U. S. 1867).
" 6 Wall. 5o (U. S. 186).
2"Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.

5o6 (U. S. 1869).
- Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 548. And see
Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522 (ig3i) in which the Supreme Court
appears to have regained for the federal government much more power than it surrendered
in Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46, 26 Sup. Ct. 655 (1907).
'7 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923). See also Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 42 Sup. Ct. 274 (1922) ; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 46
Sup. Ct. 122 (1925).
I' DODD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96-102, 222-225. The matter is discussed in Ellingham
v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. I (1912).
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as to a constitutional amendment materially changing governmental organization, if the amendment had been put into operation and continued in
effect for a number of years.'8 0 The question is not at first political in its
nature, but becomes so because lapse of time has made it so. The Pennsylvania court has recently taken the view that no judicial attack may be
made upon a constitutional amendment after its approval by the people,
and the California court appears to have reached the same result,,'
Many courts have also taken the view that delay may destroy the right
to contest the validity of legislative acts creating new counties or making
other types of territorial reorganization. 8 2 With respect to apportionment
acts, the courts have shown a natural reluctance to hold an act invalid and
thus force a return to an earlier and less satisfactory system than the one
that is destroyed. The Indiana Supreme Court refused to hold an apportionment invalid when to do so would leave no basis for the election of a
legislature unless an extra session should be called and a new apportionment
act passed; 183 and in a proceeding by mandamus to contest an apportionment, the Wyoming court said that "in order to entitle the relators to the
writ it is incumbent upon them to show a prior apportionment to fall back
to".'8 4 The Washington court in 1916 quoted with approval language used
by the Kentucky court in an earlier case:
"It may be true the laches cannot give validity to a void act, but
when no property right is involved, and the question is purely political
and administrative, individuals or parties that have seen the act in
operation for years, and the affairs of state carried on under it, without offering objection or making protest, will not be heard at a late
day to question its validity."

185

With respect to other types of legislation, the Supreme Court of Illinois
has adopted the principle that "when a statute has long been treated by the
courts as constitutional and important rights have become established thereunder, the courts may thereafter refuse to consider its constitutionality." "8l
This rule has been definitely applied when parties have sought to take ad"s Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 44', 36 Pac. 221 (1894) ; Weston v. Ryan, 7o Neb. 211, 97
N. V. 347 (1903).
' See supra notes 1O7 and io8.
"Nagel v. Bosworth, 148 Ky. 8o7, 147 S. W. 940 (I912) ; Hurley v. Motz, iI Ky. 451,
152 S. W. 248 (913)
; State ex rel. West v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 65 N. W. 818 (1896) ;
People v. Alturas County, 6 Idaho 418, 55 Pac. IO67 (1899) ; Note (i9o8) 13 L. R. A. (N. s.)
534.
'- Fessler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N. E. 37 (1895).
State v. Schnitzer, i6 Wyo. 479, 95 Pac. 698 (I9o8).
State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 546, 159 Pac. 777, 779 (1916), quoting
Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 6i, io2 S. W. 86i (i9o7). Upon this matter see also People
v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 31 N. E. 921 (1892) ; State v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 62 Pac. 237
(Igoo).
'Meister v. Carbaugh, 310 Ill. 486, 488, 142 N. E. i89, 19o (1924) ; People v. Bergin,
340 Ill. 20, 25, 172 N. E. 6o, 62 (i93o).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

vantage of procedural defects in the enactment of statutes. And the State
of New Jersey since 1873 has authorized the governor or any two or more
citizens to institute proceedings within one year to determine whether a
law or resolution was not duly passed or duly approved "as required by
the constitution of the state". The statute authorizing this proceeding,
when construed in the light of judicial unwillingness to examine journal
entries in New Jersey, substantially forbids contest of general statutes beyond the period of one year with respect to procedural defects disclosed
only by the legislative journals.187
CONCLUSION

The field of judicial non-enforcibility is important, but is not large
when contrasted with the whole body of written constitutional texts. The
exceptions from judicial enforcibility fall primarily within the field of
public or governmental interests. Moreover, aside from a limited number
of cases in which the judicial attitude is dictated by a wise political expediency, the primary issues in this field present themselves with respect to
formal and procedural requirements of state constitutions. Judicial control
over legislation is a political institution, and must be tested by the results
of its operation. Would better or worse results come from an extension of
judicial control to cover the present field of judicial non-enforcibility? 18
When courts have assumed authority to decide issues involving political
interests, they have not always inspired public confidence. It will always
be remembered that the judicial members of the Electoral Commission of
1876 voted in accord with their political affiliations. A judicial effort to
enforce the duty of state executives with respect to interstate rendition
would almost of necessity have worked less well than a plan of placing
that responsibility upon the executives themselves. Government is after all
a political institution, and political problems are better solved outside the
court room. If courts attempt their solution they fail and cripple themselves in the performance of functions properly judicial. At the same time
they reduce the feeling of responsibility that should exist in the department
charged with the power or duty to act.
With respect to formal and procedural matters, the judicial record does
not lend much support to an argument for an extended jurisdiction. The
reports contain too many hair-splitting decisions as to journal entries, sufficiency of title, and other matters of this character. By the doctrine of
"substantial compliance" the courts have in many cases reached commonsense results. Constitutional requirements as to procedure in the enactment
See supra notes 69-72 and N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4978-4980.
"sThe suggestion that judicial power be extended to the field of political questions appears to assume that such an extension is desirable. Albertsworth, ConstitutionalDuties and
Inadequate Enforcement Machinery (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 153.

NON-ENFORCIBLE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS

of legislation and in the proposal and adoption of constitutional amendments
are primarily for the purpose of preventing surprise or concealment, and
Professor Freund, some years ago, wisely suggested that there should be
a limitation upon the time within which contest of constitutionality may be
made because of failure to comply with such formal and procedural requirements.:1 9 Some courts have in part reached this result by declining
to permit contest after undue delay, and New Jersey has accomplished much
the same purpose by statute. With respect to constitutional amendments
recent Pennsylvania decisions forbid contest on procedural grounds after
popular approval.1"' The growing tendency to regard the enrolled bill as
final has an element of distinct value, though the rule may be pushed too
far when the courts defeat an effort to show that through fraud a measure
has come to have the form of law although never enacted by the legislature.
A constitutional provision not judicially enforcible in one state may
be so enforcible in another. For example, constitutional requirements as
to titles of bills are generally held to be mandatory, but are held to be
directory in Ohio.' 9 1 Perhaps it would be difficult to discover more abuse
in Ohio than in the other states. Certainly, anyone who has found it necessary to read a mass of judicial decisions as to titles of bills and as to what
,constitutes one subject in the enactment of legislation is likely to be convinced that the net loss is greater than the net gain in the judicial application of these requirements. Declarations of emergency under the referendum are subject to judicial control in Washington, but not in Oregon,
and it may be difficult to discover material differences in the results; just
as differences in the formal procedure of legislative bodies may be difficult
to discover in those recognizing or refusing to recognize the finality of an
enrolled bill. Moreover, a constitutional provision may be judicially enforcible in the same state at one time and not at another. The strongest
advocates of complete judicial enforcibility would probably not regret that
the concluding terms of an indictment in Missouri first ceased to be literally
binding and later became merely directory.
"We are much too apt to think of the judicial power of disregarding
the acts of the other departments as our only protection against oppression
and ruin." The forces that compel compliance with political safeguards
and with the essential requirements in the passage of laws and the adoption
of constitutional changes are not judicial-they are stronger than this, and
their strength is largely dependent upon the degree of final responsibility
placed upon the political organs of government.
' Freund, The Problem of Adequate Legislative Powers under State Constitutions
(1914) 5 PRoc. AcAD. PoTL Sci. 98, lO7-1oS.

See supra notes 1O7, 1O8. If a state does not permit attack after popular adoption, it

must permit proceedings to prevent submission of the question to popular vote and cannot
follow the decisions cited in supra note 159. Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 Atl. 263
(1924).

1' The constitutional language in Mississippi is directory.

